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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION: The Division of Developmental Services (DDD), within Colorado’s
Department of Human Services (the “Department”), administers three 1915(c) Medicaid waiver
programs providing home and community based services to persons with developmental
disabilities. Central to the delivery of these services is the community centered board (CCB),
which plays multiple roles in connecting people to needed services. Over the past two decades, a
variety of stakeholders have objected to the role of the CCBs and the potential for conflict of
interest. More recently, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of
the State Auditor have inquired about the potential for conflict of interest, with CMS expressing
concern that the Department implement more safeguards or alter the role of the CCB. In
response to these concerns, DDD asked the Muskie School to assist in defining appropriate
safeguards and protections related to potential conflicts of interests arising from the multiple
roles of community centered boards.
This document summarizes the information we gathered, our analysis of potential conflicts of
interest, and recommendations for addressing opportunities for improvement. The information
we gathered is based on document review, input from stakeholders, and a review of practices in
four other states. See the APPENDICES for more detail on these sources of information. Our
findings are a “point-in-time” view of the policies and infrastructure in place and may not reflect
some of the many reforms recently or soon to be implemented in the Department.
THE ROLES OF THE CCB: The CCB is at the center of the delivery system. CCBs are private
non-profit organizations. Colorado statute designates the CCB as the single entry point to the
long-term service and support system for persons with developmental disabilities within a
designated service area. Colorado currently contracts with 20 CCBs, with each CCB serving a
non-overlapping geographic region of one to ten counties and from 90 to 1,800 individuals each.
The CCB plays a series of central roles:


Single Point of Entry (SPOE): As the SPOE for developmental disability services and
supports, the CCB provides information and referral, determines eligibility for services,
and manages waiting lists.



Case Management Agency: In this role, the CCB develops individualized plans (IPs),
manages the provider selection process, and advocates on behalf of the participant.



Organized Health Care Delivery System (or Provider Contractor): An OHCDS provides
a mechanism for reimbursing providers without requiring every provider to enter into a
Provider Agreement with the Medicaid agency. As an OHCDS, the CCB is responsible
for services provided through subcontracted providers. Providers can benefit from
participating in an OHCDS because the CCB can provide a steady cash flow and reduce
financial risk connected to unexpected costs. In return, a CCB can set rates for services,
permitting the CCB to pay a provider more or less for a service than the CCB receives
from Medicaid. Provider agencies are not required to participate in an OHCDS.
Providers who do not participate in the OHCDS can still bill through the CCB or can bill
Medicaid directly.
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Service Provider: Under statute, the CCB is authorized to act as a direct service
provider. Almost all CCBs do provide direct services. The CCB is often the only major
service provider in rural areas.

Embedded in these roles are two others:


Quality Assurance: In its capacity as case management agency and as an OHCDS, the
CCB plays several quality assurance roles. It monitors IP implementation; it reviews the
overall quality of services and supports provided in its service area; it provides access to
the complaint system; and it addresses allegations of abuse, mistreatment and neglect,



Overseeing Provider Entry: Recent policy changes have significantly reduced the role of
the CCB in overseeing provider entry. Under the new policy, the CCB reviews a service
agency’s application for completeness and makes recommendations to DDD for approval
or disapproval. As part of its review, the CCB makes a site visit for a new group home or
facility-based day program. Once approved to provide a specific service, a provider
agency can provide that service in other parts of the State without obtaining further
approval.

The chart below depicts an OVERVIEW OF CCB ROLES.
Overview of CCB’s Roles

DDD

CCB

SPOE

CM

Provider
Contracts

Direct
Service

IDENTIFYING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: A “conflict of interest” is a “real or seeming
incompatibility between one’s private interests and one’s public or fiduciary duties.” 1 A CCB’s
public duty is defined by statute, regulation and contract. As an agent of the State, the CCB has a
1

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Eighth Ed., Thomson West, St Paul, MN (2004).
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duty to adhere to and promote the Department’s programmatic goals for quality, here defined to
be:
Every person meeting the State’s eligibility criteria for developmental disability services
has equitable access to services that meet individual needs and preferences, are consistent
with federal and state law, and are within existing resources.
The CCB’s private interests are those natural to any business (including any other provider)
interested in its own survival in a competitive environment. In particular, the CCB has an
interest in maximizing revenue (e.g., by increasing the number of people it serves and the
amount it is paid for services), minimizing costs (e.g., minimizing the costs associated with
meeting the needs of the people it serves), and improving its competitive position relative to
others (e.g., promoting awareness of its service).
The CCB’s private interests may be in conflict with its public duty in a variety of ways. For
example, to minimize costs, a CCB might have an incentive to avoid serving more costly
individuals. Acting on that incentive would be adverse to its duty to promote equitable access to
services.
A CCB is not unique in having public duties and private interests in potential conflict. However,
because of the multiple roles a CCB plays, there is naturally a greater opportunity for role
confusion for a CCB, as well as more opportunity for a CCB to act on its private interests. The
table on the next page, A CCB’S OPPORTUNITIES TO ACT ON PRIVATE INTERESTS AS A DIRECT
SERVICE PROVIDER, identifies:


The different roles the CCB plays and the functions performed as part of those roles.



The CCB’s public duty in fulfilling its role.



The CCB’s private interest as a provider that might be in conflict with its duty.



A listing of some of the ways a CCB could act on its private interests as a service
provider (without drawing conclusions about whether it does) when performing its
functions in other roles.

Our conclusions about the existence of these opportunities are based on our understanding of
how the delivery system works, which we have developed through document review and
stakeholder interviews. 2 We have also relied on stakeholder input to get a better understanding
of how a conflict might play out, if acted upon by a CCB. For the purpose of this analysis, we do
not draw conclusions about whether one or several or all CCBs act upon a conflict, only whether
or not a CCB has an incentive and opportunity to do so.

2

See the appendices for a listing of REFERENCE DOCUMENTS and SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDER INPUT.
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A CCB’S OPPORTUNITIES TO ACT ON PRIVATE INTERESTS AS A DIRECT SERVICE PROVIDER
Other CCB Role

Single Entry Point

 I&R
 Eligibility
Determination

CCB’s Public Duty as
Agent of State
x Allow choice of

provider
x Ensure equitable

access.

CCB’s Private
Interest as
Provider
x Gain competitive

advantage
x Minimize costs
x Maximize revenue

Opportunities to Act on
Private Interests
x Publicize CCB services, but not

other service providers to limit
access to information about other
service providers?
x Loosen interpretation of

eligibility criteria and level of
care to fill available provider
slots?

 Managing Waiting
List

x Use eligibility criteria to screen

out high cost users?
x Move people up on the waiting

list who match openings in CCB
provider agencies?
Case Management
Agency

x Allow choice of

 Service Planning

x Ensure equitable

 Provider Selection

provider
access

x Gain competitive

advantage
x Minimize costs
x Maximize revenue

x Develop service plans that favor

CCB services?
x Use service planning or provider

selection process to steer
participants toward CCB services
in order to fill open service slots?
x Use the provider selection

process to steer low cost
participants to CCB services &
high costs participants to other
providers?
OHCDS

x Allow choice of

provider

x Gain competitive

advantage
x Maximize revenue

Quality Assurance

 Monitoring Services

x Assure provider/

service quality

x Gain competitive

advantage
x Minimize costs

 Negotiate low rates with other
providers, while offering
favorable rates to own provider
agencies?*
x Suppress complaints against

CCB?
x Suppress incidents connected to

CCB?

 Complaints

x Less rigorous monitoring of CCB

 Incidents

services; resistance to
interventions?
x Less rigorous advocacy on behalf

of participant or family?

With the introduction of standardized rates, the Department expects the opportunity for conflict here to fade.
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EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT: Having identified the range
of opportunities a CCB has to act on its private interests as a provider, when performing its other
public duties, we reviewed DDD’s existing strategies for mitigating these opportunities.
Our analysis focuses on:


Safeguards: Here defined as a policy, procedure or system that works to deter a CCB
from acting contrary to the goals of the program. In evaluating existing safeguards, we
assessed whether the safeguard adequately addresses the potential conflict and whether
there are barriers to the effectiveness of the safeguard.



Discovery Methods: It is not enough to define a policy or procedure. The Department
must design and implement methods for assessing a CCB’s performance against the
standards on an ongoing basis. Is there a method to assess the effectiveness of the
safeguard in eliminating or reducing the conflict (e.g., oversight method)?



Design Features: Design features include roles, responsibilities and organizational
structures that either produce or eliminate the potential for conflict. Changes to program
design features may be warranted where no effective safeguards exist, where there are
substantial barriers to their effectiveness, or where oversight methods are weak or
unavailable to confirm that the safeguard is working.

The formal safeguards we analyzed build on the most obvious and effective safeguard against
any conflict: the professional, personal and contractual commitment of the CCB to program
goals and the pursuit of quality outcomes for participants. Reports from many stakeholders
suggest that this safeguard is present and leads to very positive experiences within the CCB. We
also heard that the CCB’s multiple and blurred roles can undermine the effectiveness of this
safeguard or confidence that it is working.
In general, our analysis showed a number of opportunities for improvement and proposed a
number of enhanced safeguards and some design options. This analysis is documented in the full
report, EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: To address the opportunities for improvement, we
identify a series of strategies for addressing the conflicts of interest inherent to the existing
delivery system. The options we propose would impose varying levels of disruption to the
existing delivery system, with varying degrees of effectiveness:


The first set of strategies are the least disruptive to the existing delivery system but are
also the least likely to effectively safeguard against conflicts of interest. This set of
recommendations assumes the CCB continues to play the same roles it does currently but
would minimize the opportunity for acting on a conflict of interest by imposing standards
for requiring greater consistency and accountability.



The second set of strategies considers a range of design options, separating out some of
the roles currently fulfilled by the CCB. In all of these options, at a minimum, the direct
service role is separated from the case management and single entry point role. These
design options impose different levels of disruption on the system but are also the most
likely to be effective at minimizing the potential for a conflict of interest.
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The third set of strategies is not directly related to the multiple roles played by the CCB
but have a significant impact on the quality of services. These issues were surfaced in
our discussion with stakeholders and information we gathered from other states. We
include them here because of their potential benefit to the Department.

Moving forward with any of these strategies must involve careful consideration of the costs and
consequences relative to the expected benefit. We heard the same theme from many families:
“Do not fix a problem for someone else by creating problems for me. Do not add an extra
administrative cost that means less money for services. If it’s not broke, don’t fix it!”
While the Department may be reluctant to disrupt what is working well, it may find compelling
reasons to do so. We suggest a balancing test, where any remedy for a conflict is weighed
against its cost and disruption to the system. If the scope and severity of a problem is minor,
ideally the cost and consequence of the remedy should be minor. However, if the problem has a
significant negative impact on quality, the cost of the remedy will have more justification.
Weighing the costs and benefits of the status quo against a proposed remedy involves a range of
competing priorities. The Department also needs to balance local control (familiarity and
responsiveness to the local community) and state level interests in equity, minimizing
inconsistent and duplicative burden on participants and providers; and compliance with state and
federal law. Deciding what weight to give competing priorities is a judgment call, 3 ideally based
on information and stakeholder input.

3

At least where there is discretion. Compliance with federal or state law, for example, would have greater weight
than the cost and availability of services.
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J INTRODUCTION
The Division of Developmental Services (DDD), within Colorado’s Department of Human
Services (the “Department”), administers three 1915(c) Medicaid waiver programs providing
home and community based services to persons with developmental disabilities. Medicaid
funded targeted case management services are also provided to this population group. Central to
the delivery of these services is the community centered board (CCB), which plays multiple roles
in connecting people to needed services. Over the past two decades, a variety of stakeholders
have objected to the role of the CCBs and the potential for conflict of interest. More recently,
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of the State Auditor have
inquired about the potential for conflict of interest, with CMS expressing concern that the
Department implement more safeguards or alter the role of the CCB. In response to these
concerns, DDD asked the Muskie School to assist in defining appropriate safeguards and
protections related to potential conflicts of interest arising from the multiple roles of Community
Centered Boards.
As part of our work, we have:


Conducted document review



Gathered stakeholder input



Developed an operational definition of “conflict of interest’



Reviewed approaches used in other states



Evaluated existing safeguards and identified opportunities for improvement.

This document summarizes the information we gathered, our analysis of potential conflicts of
interest, and recommendations for addressing opportunities for improvement.
We discuss the information we gathered in the context of our analysis. Much more detail can be
found in the reference documents we reviewed (listed in the APPENDICES) and in our SUMMARY
OF STAKEHOLDER INPUT (also in the APPENDICES). In particular, the SUMMARY OF
STAKEHOLDER INPUT provides a much deeper understanding of the range of stakeholder
perspectives than we document in our analysis.
This document must be read as a “point-in-time” view of the policies and infrastructure in place.
The Department is currently moving from quasi-managed care to a fee-for-service
reimbursement system. With this reform comes a new standardized assessment tool for
determining payment rates, a standardized rate schedule, new supporting information systems
and policies. In addition, the Department has recently upgraded some of its oversight functions.
The Department will be submitting waiver renewal applications for its three waivers reflecting
these changes. However, at this point in time not all of these changes are documented or
reflected in program rules. While this document attempts to reflect changes made subsequent to
our review, we anticipate that some have been omitted or their potential impact not fully
captured.
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J DELIVERY SYSTEM OVERVIEW
This section describes the basic elements of Colorado’s delivery system for persons with
developmental disabilities.
Oversight and Direction of Developmental Services
DDD provides leadership for the direction, funding and operation of services for persons with
developmental disabilities. DDD serves through its Medicaid and state funded programs a total
of approximately 12,400 adults and children with developmental disabilities.
DDD partners with the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing (HCPF), the
state Medicaid agency, to develop policy for DDD services funded through Medicaid. As the
designated single state Medicaid agency, HCPF is responsible to CMS for assuring that
Medicaid-funded services comply with federal requirements. HCPF is responsible for
overseeing DDD’s administration of its Medicaid funded programs.
Home and Community Based Waivers
DDD administers three waiver programs for persons with developmental disabilities:
Comprehensive Services Waiver (HCB-DD)
Comprehensive waiver services serve those adults who require extensive supports to live safely
(including access to 24-hour supervision) and who do not have other sources for meeting those
needs. Services available under the HCB-DD waiver include individual and group residential
services and supports, day services and employment services. Currently, HCB-DD services
cannot be provided in the family home. The service agency is responsible for the living
environment, which it may own or is owned by the individual or a “host home,” also known as
adult foster care. Approximately 3,790 adults currently receive services under this waiver. The
number of Medicaid-funded resources for comprehensive waiver services is 3,806 (with 66 statefunded resources).
Supported Living Services (SLS)
The Supported Living Services waiver provides assistance and support to meet daily living and
safety needs of persons who are responsible for their own living arrangements in the community.
Services are intended to augment available supports for those adults who either can live
independently with limited supports or who, if they need extensive support, are getting that
support from other sources, such as their family. DDD Rule 16.611. Services available under
the SLS waiver include personal assistance, day services and employment services. SLS services
can be provided in the family home. Approximately 2,676 adults currently receive services
under this waiver. The number of Medicaid-funded resources for supported living waiver
services is 2,892 (with 692 state-funded resources).
Children’s Extensive Services (CES)
Children’s Extensive Services provide enhanced in-home supports for those children considered
to be most in need because of the severity of the disability. CES services are intended to provide
for the stability of the family setting in order to allow the child to continue to remain in the
2
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home. Approximately 323 children currently receive services under this waiver. The number of
Medicaid-funded resources for children’s extensive services and supports is 395.
Providers
Services under these three waivers are provided through CCBs, direct service providers, and
Regional Centers. The role of each type of provider is described below:
Community Centered Boards (CCBs)
The CCB is at the center of the delivery system. CCBs first emerged in the 1960s in response to
parents and advocates seeking alternatives to institutional services for children with
developmental disabilities. CCBs are private non-profit organizations. Colorado statute
designates the CCB as the single entry point to the long-term service and support system for
persons with developmental disabilities within a designated service area. 27-10.5-102. C.R.S.
CCB designation is for a 12-month period. DDD reviews a CCB’s application for designation,
evaluating the CCB based on a range of factors, including how well the CCB has encouraged
competition. DDD is required to purchase service and support coordination services through the
CCB, except under specified conditions relating to the CCB’s failure to provide or purchase the
service, or because of poor quality. 27-10.5-104 C.R.S. DDD regulations govern the process
when DDD chooses to purchase services without involving the CCB. DDD Rule 16.225.
Colorado currently contracts with 20 CCBs, with each CCB serving a non-overlapping
geographic region of one to ten counties and from 90 to 1,800 individuals each. Resources for
services are allocated to each service area based on historical experience and the legislative
process. DDD Rule 16.226. In addition, some CCBs supplement state funding with mil-levy
funding, dedicated funding collected from local taxes.
Service Agencies
Service agencies are defined to include “individual service agencies” (i.e., an individual person
under contract with a CCB or another service agency); “developmental disabilities service
agencies,” which provide services predominantly to persons with developmental disabilities; and
“typical community service agencies,” which provide services predominantly for persons
without developmental disabilities. DDD Rule 16.221. With the approval of the DDD, both the
developmental disabilities service agencies and the “typical community service agencies” can
provide comprehensive (residential) services. These service agencies can also provide in-home
supports under the SLS or CES waiver (and in the case of “typical” service agencies, a variety of
other services and supports). The “individual service agencies” would include in-home support
providers providing services under the SLS or CES waiver.
Regional Centers (RCs)
Regional Centers are essentially state operated and licensed intermediate care facilities for
persons with mental retardation (ICFs-MR), providing waiver services to persons with
developmental disabilities having the most intensive needs. Access to RC services is through the
CCB. A Referral and Placement Committee within each service area is responsible for
reviewing and recommending a placement in a RC. Criteria limit referral to a RC to those
instances when all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted. Prior to the person entering the
RC for long-term placement, an order from a district court is required (although there are some
residents that were voluntarily admitted to the RC many years ago.) RCs provide a number of

3
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waiver services including: 24-hour supervision, residential services, day programming,
habilitation, medical, training and behavioral intervention, plus short-term emergency/crisis
support to the community system. RC case managers provide case management for all persons
receiving waiver services at the RC, although CCBs will be taking over this role in the coming
months. Colorado has three RCs (Grand Junction, Pueblo and Wheat Ridge). All three are
under the direct administrative authority of DDD, with state employees providing services.

J THE MULTIPLE ROLES OF THE CCB
The CCB plays, or can play, a wide range of roles in the DD delivery system, including:
x
x
x
x

Serving as the single entry point for DD services
Providing case management services
Providing direct services
Serving as an Organized Health Care Delivery System (or provider contractor)

Embedded in these roles are two others:
x
x

Overseeing the provider entry process
Assuring the quality of services and providers

Each of these roles is described below. Please refer to the Summary of Stakeholder Input for a
better understanding of the nature of these roles and how they are experienced by different
people.
Overview of CCB Roles
DDD

CCB

SPOE

Provider
Contracts

CM

4

Direct
Service
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The CCB’s Role as Single Point of Entry
As the designated Single Point of Entry (SPOE), the CCB performs a number of functions.
Colorado statute gives the CCB responsibility for cultivating services in its catchment area:


The CCB is required to annually submit a long-range plan to address the needs of the people
in its service area. The annual plan is to be developed through “collaborative community
efforts, facilitated by the CCB, and shall include an annual public forum.” DDD Rule
16.210.



DDD rules require that the CCB: use existing service agencies, social networks and natural
sources of support; encourage competition; and establish new services and supports for the
prevention of institutionalization. DDD Rule 16.210. The CCB’s performance on this
standard is to be assessed as part of the CCB’s annual application for redesignation as a
CCB.

A number of stakeholders discussed the role of the CCB as the community “face” for
developmental disability services. It is readily identifiable as a resource and community partner
for addressing issues affecting persons with DD.
In addition to its community role, the CCB has responsibility for a range of individualized
services including information and referral, eligibility determination and managing the waiting
list for services.

Information and Referral
The CCB has responsibility for providing information about available services, including public
and private services, and state and local services, supports and resources. DDD Rule 16.410.
Many parents identified the important role a CCB can play in this capacity, particularly for
parents who have just learned that their child has a disability and do not know where to start.

Eligibility Determination for DD Services
The CCB is responsible for determining whether or not an individual has a developmental
disability, within the State’s definition of that term. This process is governed under DDD Rule
16.420. Each CCB is required to have a Referral and Placement Committee to determine when
an individual has a developmental disability and to make referrals for Medicaid waiver services.
DDD Rule 16.450. An individual can appeal the determination under the CCB’s complaint and
grievance process. DDD Rule 16.420.

Eligibility Determination for Medicaid Waiver Services
The CCB determines whether a person is eligible for home and community based services under
the HCBS-DD waiver. Specifically, the CCB determines if the person has a developmental
disability as defined in HCPF Medical Assistance Staff Manual, 8.761.1, and administers the
ULTC 100.2, the standardized assessment used to determine level of care (LOC) and individual
needs. HCPF Medical Assistance Staff Manual, 8.401.17. The LOC assessment is used to
determine whether HCBS-DD waiver services are an appropriate option. HCPF Medical
Assistance Staff Manual, 8.405.32. An individual has a right to appeal this determination.
5
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HCPF Medical Assistance Staff Manual, 8.401.204 and 8.057. The LOC determination is also
used to determine the level of services an individual can receive under the HCBS-DD waiver.
HCPF Medical Assistance Staff Manual, 8.403. These determinations can also be appealed.
HCPF Medical Assistance Staff Manual, 8.402.53 and 8.057.

Managing Waiting Lists for Services
The CCB is required to establish a waiting list for services and supports for people eligible for
services but for whom funding is not available. The waiting list is to be maintained in
accordance with DDD guidelines and HCPF policies. DDD Rule 16.450. The CCB submits
waiting list data to a database maintained by DDD. The CCB must manage the waiting list
according to the immediacy of the need for services: as soon as available, safety net (i.e., if
current supports are lost or change), or by a specific date (e.g., turn 21, graduation). Individuals
and families must be made aware of their waiting list status and any changes that would affect
the length of wait. DDD guidelines also define date of placement on the waiting list. It is up to
the CCB to decide whether to consider the service needs of someone already receiving services
before a person not receiving services. The guidelines specify exceptions to the “First Come First
Served” rule including: the person is homeless, in an abusive or neglectful situation, a danger to
others, or a danger to him or herself. When the pool of available funds do not permit the next
person on the waiting list to be served, or under other circumstances, the CCB can ask for an
exception to First Come First Served. Also, if a resource becomes available because a person is
placed in a RC, a person from the RC must be placed in the community. A person has a right to
dispute a CCB’s management of the waiting list. DDD Guidelines for Management of Waiting
Lists.
As a service agency, the CCB has the authority to determine to whom they will or will not
provide direct services; however, before a person can be denied services the CCB needs to
document that services have been sought and that there is no willing provider to provide the
needed service. Directive Memorandum to CCB Directors, DDD, March 27, 2001.
CCB’s Role as Case Management Provider
As case management provider, the CCB has a number of other responsibilities, including
developing individualized plans, managing the provider selection process, advocating for the
people they serve, and overseeing implementation of the individualized plan.

Developing Individualized Plans
The CCB is responsible for developing individualized plans (IPs), in coordination with an
interdisciplinary team (IDT). DDD Rule 16.440. The IDT includes the person receiving
services, the parent or guardian, and others as determined by the needs and preferences of the
individual. DDD Rule 16.16.120. Currently, DDD does not prescribe a specific tool for
assessing an individual’s service needs and resources. The IP must document the individual’s
strengths, preferences, desires and needs; the services and supports appropriate to meet needs;
the planning process; IP goals; authorized services and supports funded by DDD, in sufficient
detail so provider agencies have a clear understanding of expected responsibilities and
performance. DDD Rule 16.440.
The DDD is currently implementing the Supports Intensity Scale (SIS) to measure the frequency,
intensity and volume of support that individuals need; funding allocations will be linked to this
6
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measurement. The CCBs are administering the SIS; DDD monitors the results for conformance
with an expected pattern.

Managing the Provider Selection Process
For comprehensive waiver services, the CCB is responsible for developing and implementing a
process for selecting service agencies to meet the needs and preferences of individuals seeking
services. The CCB is required to provide information concerning all existing agencies approved
to provide comprehensive services. If the person knows which service agency they wish to
choose, they may do so. 4 If the person does not have a preference, the CCB must notify
approved and prospective service agencies and solicit their interest. For those agencies
expressing interest, the CCB issues an RFP profiling the individual and the anticipated services
and supports to be provided. The CCB is to evaluate all proposals submitted in response to the
RFP, including its own, according to the same criteria. Those approved by the CCB are offered
as options to the person seeking services. DDD Rule 16.228. Upon request, the person can
review those proposals not selected by the CCB.
For SLS services, a participant or the participant’s family has the freedom to choose providers
from approved service agencies. 5 DDD Rule 16.227.

Advocating for Participants and Families
The CCB must identify who within the CCB will assist a person in filing a complaint or
grievance. DDD Rule 16.326. The case manager is responsible for promoting a person’s ability
to engage in self-advocacy. DDD Rule 16.460. In addition, under the Medicaid rule for
Targeted Case Management, case management includes advocating on behalf of their clients to
access the services and support programs identified in their individualized plan. HCPF Medical
Assistance Staff Manual, 8.761.14.
The CCB’s Role as Service Provider
The CCB is also authorized to act as a direct service provider. 27-10.5-104. C.R.S. Almost all
CCBs do provide services. In rural parts of Colorado, the CCB may be the only service provider.
One CCB executive reported that his CCB became a service provider only because it had
previously been “held hostage” by service providers when negotiating over rates and placement.
Other CCB representatives that we talked to said that, if forced to choose, they see themselves as
a direct service provider before they are a case management agency.
The CCB’s Role as Organized Health Care Delivery System (OHCDS)
The CCB can also operate as an Organized Health Care Delivery System (OHCDS). Pursuant to
a CMS policy statement made in a letter to State Medicaid Directors (dated December 20, 1993),
an OHCDS provides at least one Medicaid service directly but also contracts with other qualified
providers to furnish other covered services. An OHCDS provides a mechanism for reimbursing
providers without requiring every provider to enter into a Provider Agreement with the Medicaid
agency; this mechanism is helpful where a state wants to promote the use of non-traditional
4

Although DDD rules currently condition an individual’s choice of provider on the CCB’s approval, DDD reports
that this requirement is no longer operative under the new standard fee structure. Communication from Matthew
Solano, October 2007.
5
Again, DDD rules condition individual choice on DDD concurrence; DDD reports this requirement is no longer
operative under the new standard fee structure.

7

Muskie School of Public Service

providers (e.g., a housecleaning or laundry service) or individual providers, such as family
member or neighbor providing personal assistance services.
The OHCDS is responsible for the services provided by the subcontracted provider. 42 CFR
434.6(c). Providers can benefit from participating in an OHCDS because the CCB can provide a
steady cash flow and reduce financial risk connected to unexpected costs (e.g., costs associated
with a psychiatric crisis or an adaptation not reimbursable under Medicaid). In return, a CCB
can set rates for services, permitting the CCB to pay a provider more or less for a service than the
CCB receives from Medicaid.
Technically, all CCBs are OHCDSs. CMS’ Freedom of Choice policy requires that an individual
seeking services have their choice of any qualified provider who chooses to provide services to
the individual. An individual, therefore, cannot be limited to OHCDS providers and approved
providers are not required to participate in an OHCDS in order to provide services. The
OHCDS is also not required to accepted all providers as part of the OHCDS. The CCB can
charge providers fees for processing claims.
The CCB may also act as a business agent for the service provider, i.e., only providing billing
services for the agency and not fulfilling the other roles that an OHCDS can serve.
Under the SLS and CES waivers, the CCB serves as the Support Coordinating Agency, and is
authorized to provide services directly or to sub-contract with other service agencies. DDD Rule
16.611. Currently, service agencies must contract with the Support Coordinating Agency to
provide any waiver services under the SLS and CES waivers.
Thus, provider agencies have three options for billing and payment: the agency can obtain a
Medicaid provider number from HCPF and bill Medicaid directly; the agency can subcontract
with the CCB as part of an Organized Health Care Delivery System; or the agency can use the
CCB or some other entity as a business agent for billing services. Per CMS requirements, DDD
and HCPF have taken steps to ensure all service providers are aware that the service agency may
bill Medicaid directly. The CCB has a very limited role in monitoring claims payments and
billings for those service provider agencies billing Medicaid directly, limited only to confirming
that the person is receiving the services specified in his or her service plan.
The CCB’s Role in Managing Provider Entry
Previously, the CCB played a strong role in controlling provider entry into its service area, for all
developmental services agencies and any typical community service agency planning to provide
comprehensive services. DDD Rule 16.222. The regulations specified minimum criteria for a
CCB selecting and approving a provider. A provider had to obtain the approval of the CCB in
every service area in which it wanted to operate.
Pursuant to a policy directive issued in March 26, 2007, the CCB’s role has been significantly
reduced. The CCB reviews a service agency’s application for completeness. The CCB makes
recommendations to DDD, to inform DDD’s approval decision. However, it must document the
basis for any recommendation to disapprove. As part of its review, the CCB makes a site visit
for a new group home or facility-based day program. Once approved to provide a specific
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service, a provider agency can provide that service in other parts of the state without obtaining
further approval.
The CCB’s Role in Assuring Service Quality
In addition to monitoring implementation of an individualized plan, the CCB has several other
roles connected to quality assurance, including monitoring the overall performance of a service
provider, responding to complaints, and addressing critical incidents and allegations of abuse and
neglect.

Monitoring Indiviualized Plan Implementation
As the case management agency, the CCB is responsible for monitoring the delivery and quality
of services and supports, the health, safety and welfare of the participant, and the participant’s
satisfaction with services and choice of service provider. In addition, the CCB is responsible for
promoting the individual’s ability to engage in self-determination, self-representation, and selfadvocacy. DDD Rule 16.460.

Monitoring Overall Provider Performance
In its capacity as an Organized Health Care Delivery System, the CCB is also responsible for
reviewing the overall quality of services and supports provided in its service area, including
general satisfaction with services, general practices of service agencies regarding health, welfare
and safety of the people it serves, fiscal compliance related to implementing the IP, and the
nature and frequency of complaints connected to service agency. DDD Rule 16.460. DDD
Program quality standards require each CCB to develop and implement a written CCB
monitoring plan to describe monitoring activities, frequency, documentation, etc.

Providing Access to a Complaint and Grievance Process
The CCB is required to have procedures for resolving disputes related to: a decision that an
applicant is not eligible for services, a decision to provide, modify, reduce or deny services or
supports as specified in the IP; a decision to terminate services or supports; and a decision that
the person receiving services is no longer eligible for services. DDD Rule 16.322. The
grievance is heard by an impartial decision maker. An “impartial decision maker” is someone
who has not been directly involved in the specific decision at issue and may be a CCB executive
director. The duties of the impartial decision maker are defined; the impartial decision maker
may not talk to either party about the dispute without the other present. DDD Policy:
Conducting an Effective Evidentiary Meeting as Part of the Developmental Disabilities System’s
Dispute Resolution Process. (September 2000). CCB decisions can be appealed to DDD. DDD
Rule, 16.322. (These dispute resolution processes supplement but are not a prerequisite to an
individual’s right to a Medicaid fair hearing.)
The CCB is also required to have a process for timely resolution of grievances or complaints.
DDD provides that use of the grievance procedure will not prejudice a person’s right to services.
DDD Rule 16.326.

Addressing Incidents and Allegations of Abuse, Mistreatment and Neglect
The CCB and service agencies are required to have written policies and procedures for timely
reporting, recording and reviewing of incidents. Allegations of abuse, mistreatment, neglect,
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exploitation, or injuries that require emergency medical treatment or result in death, must be
reported to the CCB within 24 hours. DDD Rule 16.580. In addition, all provider agencies,
CCBs and Regional Centers are required to report to law enforcement any allegations which may
indicate a crime has been committed; reports about at-risk adults must be made to the county
adult protective units.
The CCB is required to establish a Human Rights Committee (HRC) as a third-party mechanism
for protecting the rights of participants. The HRC is advisory; it reviews the practices of the
CCB and service agencies to make sure practices are consistent with protecting participant rights.
The HRC is required to include two professional persons trained in the application of behavioral
development techniques, three representatives of persons receiving services, their parents, legal
guardians or authorized representatives. No employee or board member of a service agency
within the CCB’s service area can serve on the HRC. 27-10.5-105.5 C.R.S. The CCB provides
staff support to facilitate HRC functions. DDD Rule 16.550.

J IDENTIFYING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Defining Conflict of Interest
A “conflict of interest” is a “real or seeming incompatibility between one’s private interests and
one’s public or fiduciary duties.” 6 A CCB’s “public duty” is defined by statute, regulation and
contract. As an agent of the State, the CCB has a duty to adhere to and promote the
Department’s programmatic goals for quality, here defined to be:
Every person meeting the State’s eligibility criteria for developmental disability services
has equitable access to services that meet individual needs and preferences, are consistent
with federal and state law, and are within existing resources.
The CCB’s “private interests” are those natural to any business (including any other provider)
interested in its own survival in a competitive environment. In particular, the CCB has an
interest in maximizing revenue (e.g., by increasing the number of people it serves and the
amount it is paid for services), minimizing costs (e.g., minimizing the costs associated with
meeting the needs of the people it serves), and improving its competitive position relative to
others (e.g., promoting awareness of its service).
The CCB’s private interests may be in conflict with its public duty in a variety of ways. For
example, to minimize costs, a CCB might have an incentive to avoid serving more costly
individuals. Acting on that incentive would be adverse to its duty to promote equitable access to
services.
In talking about a conflict of interest, it is important to distinguish between the existence of a
conflict of interest and whether or not a CCB acts upon that conflict. Our analysis focuses only
on the ways in which a CCB’s roles create opportunities for acting on private interests, not
6

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Eighth Ed., Thomson West, St Paul, MN (2004).
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whether a CCB does act upon those interests. In the next section, EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT, we will evaluate whether existing safeguards effectively
prevent a CCB from acting upon a conflict.
Opportunities to Act on a Conflict of Interest
A CCB is not unique in having public duties and private interests in potential conflict. However,
because of the multiple roles a CCB plays, there is naturally a greater opportunity for role
confusion for a CCB, as well as more opportunity for a CCB to act on its private interests. The
following discussion reviews these multiple roles and the increased opportunity to act on a
conflict. Our discussion focuses primarily on the CCB’s private interests as a service provider
and how that role, when combined with other CCB roles, creates incentives and opportunities to
act on the CCB’s private interest. We also briefly discuss how the CCB’s private interests as a
case management agency or an organized health care delivery system (OHCDS) interacts with
other roles.
Our conclusions about the existence of these opportunities are based on our understanding of
how the delivery system works, which we have developed through document review and
stakeholder interviews. 7 We have also relied on stakeholder input to get a better understanding
of how a conflict might play out, if acted upon by a CCB. Again, we do not draw any
conclusions about whether one or several or all CCBs act upon a conflict, only whether or not a
CCB has an incentive and opportunity to do so.
The CCB’s Role as Direct Service Provider
The CCB role creating the most incentive to act on a conflict of interest is the CCB’s role as
service provider. The interaction of this role with each of the CCB’s other roles is discussed
below.
Dual Role: CCB as Service Provider and Single Point of Entry
As the single point of entry, the CCB has the opportunity to operate in its self-interest when
providing information and referral services, determining eligibility for services, and
managing the waiting list.
As the single entry point, the CCB can create a competitive advantage for itself by providing
information and referral services that favor its own services over other providers. Some of
the ways in which a CCB might fail to adequately perform its information and referral
obligations because of its conflict of interest:

7



Sponsoring informational meetings or publishing newsletters where only the CCB’s
services are presented or advertised.



Giving participants and families the option between the CCB’s services or a list of
providers to sort through on their own, without CCB assistance.



Failing to provide information about other service providers.

See the appendices for a listing of REFERENCE DOCUMENTS and SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDER INPUT.
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The CCB can also create a competitive advantage for itself by blurring the distinction
between its single point of entry and case management roles and its role as service provider
by using the same name or co-locating services.
In determining eligibility and level of care, a CCB might want to screen out people it finds
hard to serve or screen in people to fill openings with its service agency. A CCB’s decisions
about who should move up on the waiting list could be influenced by who on the waiting list
might best fit into an opening in the CCB’s service agency.
Dual Role: CCB as Service Provider and Case Management Agency
As the case management agency, the CCB has the opportunity to act on its self-interest when
developing an individualized plan and when overseeing the selection of providers.
When developing the IP, a CCB can steer participants and individuals into CCB services.
For example, the case manager could refer a person down the hall to the CCB’s provider, or
the CCB representatives participating in the meeting could offer to provide the services
during the planning meeting circumventing the need for an RFP process. The CCB could
also shape the individualized plan to match the services it has available.
The CCB can use the provider selection process to create a competitive advantage for itself
and to maximize its revenue and minimize costs. Some of the ways the CCB could act upon
these conflicts include:


Steering participants to CCB services. “Steering” could be the result of intentional
(e.g., questioning a participant’s choice of another provider) or unintentional acts
(e.g., a case manager is more familiar with the CCB’s services and can offer less
information about the other options available).



Failing to solicit interest from a range of providers. Failing to fairly evaluate
proposals submitted by other providers.



“Cherry picking” the easier to serve and steering high-cost participants to other
providers.

Again, co-location of case management and other services can create a competitive
advantage for the CCB: the path of least resistance leads across the hall to the CCB’s
employment services or day habilitation provider.
Dual Role: CCB as Organized Health Care Delivery System
When a CCB is both acting as a provider and is responsible for setting rates as an Organized
Health Care Delivery System, the CCB has the opportunity to establish rates that are
favorable to its own service agencies. (The Department expects this conflict to fade with the
introduction of standardized rates.)
Dual Role: CCB as Service Provider and its Quality Assurance Role
The CCB’s quality assurance functions could be influenced by its role as a provider.
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When serving as the impartial hearing officer for resolving disputes over access to
services, or when addressing complaints and grievances, the CCB has the opportunity
to make decisions that favor its provider agency.



The case manager has the opportunity to dissuade or discourage complaints against
the CCB’s provider agency.



The CCB has the opportunity to suppress, minimize, or inadequately address
incidents, or allegations of abuse, mistreatment, neglect, etc.



When monitoring provider and service quality, the CCB has the opportunity to hold
itself to a lower standard than its competitors. One case manager described the subtle
effect of personal relationships developed by working in the same location. “They’re
in the lunchroom together every day,” making it more difficult for the case
management side of the CCB to challenge the performance of the provider side.

Dual Role: CCB as Service Provider and its Role Managing Provider Entry
Recent policy changes significantly reduce the opportunity for a CCB to limit competition
from other providers. We assume that this role has been sufficiently reduced to no longer
pose a significant opportunity to inappropriately limit provider entry.
The table, CCB’S OPPORTUNITIES TO ACT ON PRIVATE INTERESTS AS A PROVIDER on the next
page summarizes the ways in which the CCB’s other roles provide an opportunity for the CCB to
act on its private interest and against its public duty.


The first column identifies the different roles the CCB plays and the functions
performed as part of those roles.



The second column identifies the CCB’s public duty in fulfilling its role. For
example, as the single entry point, a CCB has a public duty to ensure equitable access
to services.



The third column identifies the CCB’s private interest as a provider that might be in
conflict with its duty. For example, the CCB’s interest in minimizing cost might be
in conflict with its duty to provide equitable access if it wants to avoid serving high
cost individuals.



The fourth column identifies a range of possible ways a CCB could act on its private
interests as a service provider (without drawing conclusions about whether it does)
when performing functions in its other roles. This list is meant to be illustrative and
does not represent all of the ways a CCB might act on a conflict, as identified by
stakeholders. See the SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDER INPUT for more.

The CCB’s Role as Case Management Agency
As a case management agency, a CCB has a similar set of private interests that, when combined
with its other roles, also create increased opportunities for the CCB to act on its private interests.
For example, as both single entry point and case management agency, the CCB can use the
eligibility determination process to screen out high cost users or reduce the number of people on
the waiting list. It can also loosen eligibility criteria to increase the number of people it provides
case management services to.
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A CCB’S OPPORTUNITIES TO ACT ON PRIVATE INTERESTS AS A DIRECT SERVICE PROVIDER
Other CCB Role

Single Entry Point

 I&R
 Eligibility
Determination

CCB’s Public Duty as
Agent of State
x Allow choice of

provider
x Ensure equitable

access.

CCB’s Private
Interest as
Provider
x Gain competitive

advantage
x Minimize costs
x Maximize revenue

Opportunities to Act on
Private Interests
x Publicize CCB services, but not

other service providers to limit
access to information about other
service providers?
x Loosen interpretation of

eligibility criteria and level of
care to fill available provider
slots?

 Managing Waiting
List

x Use eligibility criteria to screen

out high cost users?
x Move people up on the waiting

list who match openings in CCB
provider agencies?
Case Management
Agency

x Allow choice of

 Service Planning

x Ensure equitable

 Provider Selection

provider
access

x Gain competitive

advantage
x Minimize costs
x Maximize revenue

x Develop service plans that favor

CCB services?
x Use service planning or provider

selection process to steer
participants toward CCB services
in order to fill open service slots?
x Use the provider selection

process to steer low cost
participants to CCB services &
high costs participants to other
providers?*
OHCDS

x Allow choice of

provider

x Gain competitive

advantage
x Maximize revenue

Quality Assurance

 Monitoring Services

x Assure provider/

service quality

x Gain competitive

advantage
x Minimize costs

 Negotiate low rates with other
providers, while offering
favorable rates to own provider
agencies?
x Suppress complaints against

CCB?
x Suppress incidents connected to

CCB?

 Complaints

x Less rigorous monitoring of CCB

 Incidents

services; resistance to
interventions?
x Less rigorous advocacy on behalf

of participant or family?

With the introduction of standardized rates, the Department expects the opportunity for conflict here to fade.
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The CCB’s Role as Organized Health Care Delivery System
The CCB role as an Organized Health Care Delivery System (OHCDS) also creates a very
similar array of private interests, potentially playing out when the CCB performs its other roles.
For example, when serving as the single point of entry or the case management agency, the CCB
might have an incentive to steer people to OHCDS providers, to less rigorously monitor the
quality of OHCDS providers, etc. To the degree that the CCB is able to steer people to
particular providers, the CCB can create an inappropriate incentive for providers to participate in
the OHCDS (in addition to the services and protections that appropriately come with being part
of the OHCDS).

J EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
IMPROVEMENT
In this section, we evaluate whether potential conflicts are adequately addressed through existing
safeguards, whether safeguards can be enhanced, or whether a change to program design features
is desirable.
We define “safeguard” to mean:
A policy, procedure or system that works to deter a CCB from acting contrary to the
Department’s programmatic goals for quality.
While we understand that CCBs may impose their own safeguards to promote appropriate
behavior, this section focuses on safeguards that are or could be imposed by the Department. To
assess the adequacy of a safeguard, we raise two questions:


Does the safeguard adequately address the potential conflict? Are there barriers to the
effectiveness of the safeguard?



Is there a method to assess the effectiveness of the safeguard in eliminating or reducing
the conflict (e.g., oversight method)?

Changes to program design features may be warranted where no effective safeguards exist,
where there are substantial barriers to their effectiveness, or where oversight methods are weak
or unavailable to confirm that the safeguard is working.
We define “design features” as:
Roles, responsibilities and organizational structures that either produce or eliminate the
potential for conflict.
The most obvious and effective safeguard for any conflict is the professional, personal and
contractual commitment of the CCB to program goals and the pursuit of quality outcomes for
participants. While we offer an appraisal of safeguards to eliminate conflicts or mitigate their
impact, none can succeed without the integrity and commitment of the CCB. Reports from many
stakeholders suggest that this safeguard is present and leads to very positive experiences within
the CCB. We also heard that the CCB’s multiple and blurred roles can undermine the
effectiveness of this safeguard or confidence that it is working.
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In addition, while in the previous section we talked about a number of incentives that can operate
against quality, we have not itemized those instances that operate to promote quality. Examples
cited by the CCBs include the CCB’s interest in assuring quality to avoid liability, or the costs
connected to a crisis. We do not attempt to assess the possible impact of these “natural”
safeguards, but note that they are also likely to play a positive role.
Our analysis below reflects findings from a review of four states that allow the same entity to
perform case management and service provision (OH, SD, VT and WY). A full review of their
practices with respect to waiver functions is presented in APPENDIX B.
The following tables examine the adequacy of current safeguards and oversight methods for
potential conflicts deriving from the CCB’s interest as a service provider and its other roles (see
TABLE: A CCB’S OPPORTUNITIES TO ACT ON PRIVATE INTERESTS AS A DIRECT SERVICE
PROVIDER, page 14).


POTENTIAL CONFLICT summarizes the nature of the conflict. Potential conflicts are
organized according to roles described in the first column of the TABLE on page 14.



EXISTING SAFEGUARDS identify protections currently in place in Colorado to reduce
the likelihood of a CCB acting on a conflict or mitigating its impact.



PROPOSED SAFEGUARD ENHANCEMENTS identify additional safeguards or
enhancements to existing safeguards proposed by the authors.



PROPOSED DESIGN FEATURES identify changes to program design proposed by the
authors.



DDD OVERSIGHT METHODS describe existing processes and tools used by DDD to
assess whether a safeguard is working as intended. Oversight methods listed in italics
are processes and tools proposed by the authors to supplement existing oversight
methods.



BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVENESS identify the authors’ understanding of issues that may
undermine the adequacy of a given safeguard or oversight method.

16

Muskie School of Public Service

Information and Referral (I&R)
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB is the focal point for participants and families to learn about available
services and supports in the community in an objective and comprehensive manner. As a direct provider of
care, the CCB has the discretion to limit access to information about other service providers or to bias
information in favor of its own providers.
Existing Safeguards
Oversight Method
Barriers to Effectiveness
(Italics = proposed)
CCB required to provide
information on all available
services and supports that may
be available to persons with
DD

x Participant survey to assess
understanding of available
resources to support persons
with DD.

x CCB might not provide assistance to
participant in sorting through the
service provider options.
x CCBs may withhold information
about available service providers

Statewide referral list of
approved service agencies in
the CCB’s designated service
area is posted on the
Department website.

x Participant survey to assess
understanding of available
resources to support persons
with DD.

x Website viewed as not user-friendly,
insufficient information to inform
decisions on quality.
x CCB less knowledgeable about other
community resources that could
address needs of clients.

x DDD conducts onsite quality
reviews of CCB
performance including
review of I&R activities, on
more frequent basis.
x Log of I&R requests and
actions taken by CCB.
x Participant survey to assess
understanding of available
resources
x DDD conducts onsite quality
reviews of CCB
performance including
review of promotional
activities.

x Administrative burden of maintaining
a log of requests and actions.
x DDD onsite quality review does not
focus on role of CCB in I&R.
x DDD onsite quality review happens
infrequently.

Proposed
Safeguard Enhancements
Department protocol defining
CCB’s handling and
documentation of I&R
activities

Prohibit promotion of CCB
service providers at the
exclusion of other community
providers and resources.

x Role in I&R can be confused with
opportunities to promote CCBs own
service providers
x No separation of CCB identity as
single entry point and service
provider (e.g., co-located, same
name)

Proposed Design Feature:
x Remove I & R from CCB responsibility in all or some (e.g., urban) CCBs

Current safeguards focus on requirements that the CCB fully inform participants of the array of
services and resources in the community to serve persons with developmental disabilities and a
state referral list that standardizes information about available qualified DD providers. Neither
of these safeguards sufficiently embrace the CCB’s broader role in promoting service integration
and awareness among all service providers, including those not specific to the DD population but
which may affect their lives or wellbeing (e.g., vocational rehab services or housing subsidies).
Two safeguard enhancements could strengthen the role of I & R and engage the CCB beyond its
more narrow perspective as service provider. A comprehensive guide or protocol for conducting
the I&R function, combined with more regular reporting to and review by the Department of
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activities, would enhance CCB understanding of its responsibilities to promote and refer to a
broad community of resources beneficial to participants. A safeguard prohibiting the CCB from
promoting its own services at the exclusion of others would help to distinguish its obligations for
community outreach and awareness building from marketing its own services. Each of these
safeguards has barriers to effectiveness.
Removing the I&R function from the CCB eliminates role confusion but also has potential costs
and consequences. Rural areas, in particular, may lack the infrastructure and knowledgeable staff
to establish I&R functions outside the CCB structure.
Eligibility Determination
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB conducts the level of care determination and assesses whether an individual meets the
target population criteria for the waiver program. These functions give the CCB discretion to limit equitable access to
services by screening people out who are hard to serve or giving advantage to others.
Existing Safeguards
CCB is required to use a
prescribed tool (ULTC-100.2)
and criteria and to document
decisions on a web-based
database maintained by Medicaid.

Participant has a right to appeal
CCB decisions to the Department.

Oversight Methods
(Italics = proposed)
x BUS runs internal system error check
verifying eligibility based on reported
information
x DDD Medicaid staff reviews ULTC
100.2, final Service Plan and IP cover
sheet for internal consistency
x DDD conducts onsite quality reviews
of CCB performance, including review
of appropriateness of eligibility
determinations, every 3 years
x Medicaid conducts periodic review of
LOC for conformance with state and
federal assurances
x Conduct focused study of LOC
determinations by CCB
x Participant survey to assess
awareness of appeal process
x Review frequency of appeals on
LOC/waiver denials
x Review frequency of appeals upheld

Barriers to Effectiveness
x Variability in interpretation of
determination criteria by the CCB.
x Infrequency of DDD onsite quality
reviews

x Access to advocate to assist during
appeal process
x Fear of retaliation
x Intimidating, formal process

Proposed
Safeguard Enhancement
Reduce interpretive variation in
x Medicaid conducts periodic review of
LOC determinations among
LOC for conformance with state and
CCBs through enhanced training
federal assurances.
Proposed Design Features:
x CCB conducts LOC and waiver eligibility review; Department approves determinations.
x Department conducts and approves LOC and waiver eligibility determinations.

Under existing safeguards, the Department has a standardized instrument and process for
conducting LOC determinations and a database documenting LOC decisions made by the CCB.
Federal rules allow entities other than Medicaid to make LOC determinations but the Medicaid
agency must oversee the performance of the entity, including ensuring that applicable level of
care criteria have been properly applied. These provisions require the Department to
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independently assess the quality of LOC reviews performed by the CCB. Currently, onsite
quality reviews are the only oversight method for validating LOC documentation. In an
agreement with DHS, Medicaid requires that a statistically valid sample of participant functional
assessments be shared with the agency for review. While these reviews are able to assess the
completeness and timeliness of LOC determinations, they are unable to assess their validity. We
are concerned that the onsite quality review, which includes meeting with participants and
comparing their functional status with the LOC assessment, is conducted only once every 3
years.
Of the states reviewed for this study, all four require the state to make final determinations with
respect to LOC determination. The accountability placed on Medicaid for LOC determinations
suggests to us that more careful study is needed to determine whether this function is being
appropriately conducted at the CCB level. Unless onsite quality reviews are conducted on a
more regular basis, we are concerned that there is insufficient information upon which to show
ongoing evidence of compliance with CMS assurances. The optional design feature proposes to
insert the Department directly in the eligibility determination process, a remedy that while
solving the problem, has significant cost implications.
Administration of the Waiting List
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: Each CCB is responsible for managing the waiting list within its catchment area.
This role gives discretion to the CCB to favor individuals in providing more rapid placement or to fill
openings in its service agency.
Existing Safeguards
Persons are selected for
services from the waiting list
according to criteria and
interpretive guidelines
established by the Department.

Proposed
Safeguard Enhancement
Strengthen guidance on
decisions related to waiting list
allocations, especially in cases
of emergency.

Oversight Methods
(Italics = proposed)
x CCB is required to enter
waiting list documentation
into CCMS, a web
environment designed and
accessible to DDD
x DDD conducts onsite
quality reviews of CCB
performance, including
management of waiting list

Barriers to Effectiveness
x Discretion in how to apply criteria.
x Infrequency of state onsite quality
reviews

More timely review by DDD of
cases where individuals are
placed on the waiver out of
sequence with their eligibility
date.

Proposed Design Options:
x CCB recommends slot allocations from the waiting list; the Department approves
x Centralize management of the waiting list.

The central statewide data base on the waiting list provides useful information to DDD on the
movement of individuals on and off the waiting list by catchment area. We would suggest that
this information be more carefully monitored, especially with respect to decisions where
individuals are taken out of sequence for placement when a waiver opening becomes available.
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Two of the states reviewed (SD and WY) maintain the waiting list at the State level and allocate
available slots centrally. Two states (OH, VT) delegate responsibility for the waiting list to the
local entity, requiring routine reporting to the State on its status.
Strengthening review of outliers is an important safeguard enhancement but, as long as authority
for allocating slots remains with the CCB, the Department is placed in a reactive role to correct
inappropriate decisions. Two design options remove decision-making authority from the CCB,
thus eliminating the basis of the conflict.
Service Planning
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB case manager, together with the participant and interdisciplinary team,
develops an individualized plan specifying the scope and frequency of services required in response to a
participant’s needs and preferences. This role gives the CCB discretion to identify service needs that benefit its
own service providers or to steer participants into its own services.
Existing Safeguards
DDD Oversight Methods
Barriers to Effectiveness
(Italics = proposed)
The Department specifies
x Select elements from IPs
x CCB bias in identifying service needs
elements that must be addressed
entered into state database
based on its own service provision
in the IP and the process and
for review
timelines for its completion.
x DDD conducts onsite quality
reviews of CCB
performance, including IP
development, every 3 years
x DDD reviews 20% sample
of IPs on day programs,
residential and SLS/CES,
every 3 years
x Medicaid reviews all initial
IPs
x Medicaid reviews IPs for
consistency with state and
CMS assurances
The CCB is required to convene x DDD conducts onsite quality x Limited check on CCB influence over
an interdisciplinary team (IDT)
reviews of CCB
IDT composition
to facilitate service planning.
performance, including
x Composition can be driven by CCB
composition of ID,
service agency
Support Intensity Scale (SIS) to x Medicaid conducts periodic
x Perceived to be subject to gaming and
reduce variations in service
review of IPs for
variations across CCBs
planning.
conformance with state and
federal assurances
Proposed
Safeguard Enhancements
Enhance training and oversight
x Participant survey to assess
x Neutrality of CCB.
of case manager’s role as
IP development process.
neutral facilitator of IP.
Required composition of IDT to x Medicaid conducts periodic
x Can be inconsistent with participant
include external providers
review of Plan of Care for
choice and control
conformance with state and
federal assurances
Optional Design Features:
x Provide option for independent case manager to develop IP or resource person to attend IP development
meeting.
x No longer allow case management agency to provide direct services.
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The development of an effective IP rests on the ability of a case manager to provide guidance
grounded solely on the interests of the participant. This relationship must be built on trust and
confidence that other considerations do not interfere with decisions relative to what is best for
the participant within available resources.
The introduction of the SIS and documentation of individualized plans on the BUS enhances
standardization and review by the Department to assure consistent development of IPs within
and across CCBs. The Department’s onsite quality reviews offer the best opportunity to validate
the accuracy and fairness of IPs. These are conducted at the CCB and service agency levels
every 3 years. While this results in a significant overall sample of IPs being reviewed each year
(estimated to be approximately 800), it does not necessarily mean that IPs are reviewed for each
CCB on an annual basis. We understand the resource intensity of conducting onsite reviews and,
if annual reviews are not possible, we suggest that data available through the BUS and other
sources be used to assess trends that may suggest inappropriate service planning by CCBs on an
ongoing basis.
Revising composition requirements for the IDT to include persons outside the employ of the
CCB could help neutralize the potential for conflict. Imposing requirements on IDT
membership, however, may undermine participant’s voice in the planning process.
Our four-state review revealed several strategies for addressing this conflict. Protections in
these states fall into 3 major categories:
x

Frequent and prescribed assessment by the state of the local service planning process and its
conformance with guidelines (OH, SD, VT, WY).

x

The establishment of a uniform assessment process that limits discretion and eases periodic
review for conformance to guidelines (VT)

x

The introduction of an independent party to participate in plan of care meetings (WY)

We believe that the proposed design feature of introducing an independent party during IP
development offers a solution for those participants who avail themselves of the resource. The
design feature of eliminating case management agencies from delivering direct service restores
objectivity to the process for all participants.
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Provider Selection
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB case manager is responsible for assuring that participants are fully informed of
all qualified providers in an area and overseeing the selection of providers with the participant. The CCB has the
discretion to steer participants to the agency’s providers or those favored by the agency.
Existing Safeguards
Oversight Methods
Barriers to Effectiveness
(Italics = proposed)
CCBs are required to follow a
x DDD conducts onsite reviews
x Not all participants or their families
process of developing a
of CCB performance, including
know to ask to see their profiles to
participant profile and soliciting
sample review of participant
assure its accuracy.
provider interest through a RFP.
profiles and RFPs to determine x Transparency of process for soliciting
consistency with policy
provider interest and reviewing
x Written acknowledgement by
provider proposals.
participant of receipt of
x Infrequency of state onsite quality
provider information
review
x Steering to CCB services before
selection process is initiated.
Referral list provided by the
x Participant survey to assess
x Updates and accuracy of referral list
Department for approved
adequacy and
x Limited information for assessing
services in a service area.
comprehensiveness of referral
quality
list
x Case manger’s lack of knowledge or
unwillingness to assist with. sorting
options
Proposed
Safeguard Enhancements
Six month review of provider
choices with participants.
More prescriptive standards for
provider selection process.

x Written acknowledgement by
participant that case manager
reviewed service options
x DDD conducts onsite reviews
of CCB performance, including
review of provider selection
process
x Participant survey to assess
usefulness of provider profiles

x Administrative burden
x Potential disruption to service delivery

Standard profile of provider
x Timely access to accurate and
attributes and quality
consistent data.
performance
Proposed Design Features:
x State employs/contracts with independent case managers as an option for participants during provider
selection process.
x Centralize provider selection process through a state or independent entity.

Central to the waiver program and federal assurances is a person’s freedom to select among
qualified providers. The lack of transparency in the process and a standard means for monitoring
adherence to the Department protocol undermine trust that the system is working as it should.
The four study states all retain responsibility for facilitating provider choice at the case manager
level. Three have safeguards to reduce potential conflict. Vermont involves the State in
decisions when the designated agency disagrees with the participant on his or her choice.
Wyoming requires case managers to review provider choices with the participant every six
months and to have the participant attest to the discussion. Ohio is developing a user-friendly
website on certified providers for use by participants and families to make them more informed
and engaged in the provider selection process.
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Current safeguards and enhancements all have significant barriers to their effectiveness. The
design feature for participants to work with an independent case manager eliminates the conflict
for those opting to use it while raising cost and logistical issues that we have not considered.
This option creates some additional conflicts of interest for the CCB, which may have an
incentive to limit access to information about this option or refer difficult to serve participants to
the alternative case management agency. Eliminating the provider selection process from the
role of the CCB is a more comprehensive design feature that removes the question of bias for all
participants, but with obvious cost implications.
Rate Negotiation
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: When acting as an organized health care delivery system (OHCDS), a CCB can set
rates for services, permitting the CCB to pay its own provider agencies for the same service more than it
does other providers.
Existing Safeguards
Oversight Methods
Barriers to Effectiveness
(Italics = proposed)
State rules govern purchase
service rates and allowable fees
for services provided to
network providers.

Dispute resolution process.
Proposed
Safeguard Enhancement
More specific guidance on
allowable withholds for
administrative fees.

x DDD conducts onsite reviews
of CCB performance,
including review of rate
determinations.
x Department review of methods
for determining rates and fees
in advance of their adoption
by the CCB.
x Dispute resolution findings
reported to Department.

x No opportunity for public comment
x Different rates within and across
CCBs may result in variations in
services and quality.

x Fear of retaliation

x DDD conducts onsite reviews
of CCB performance,
including review of rate
determinations

Proposed Design Feature:
x Separate OHCDS from the CCB.

Existing safeguards leave discretion to the CCB to negotiate service rates with their network
providers, notwithstanding a State-established rate for each Medicaid service. While we
understand this to be a business transaction with provider partners that is an acceptable and legal
practice, it has the potential to lead to inequities in service delivery and therefore should be the
subject of regular Department oversight. The dispute resolution process for providers introduces
independent review of the arrangement and mitigates against unfair practices. Our review did
not include an analysis of the federal OHCDS rules to determine the constraints that may be
imposed on the negotiation. Nor did we examine how this practice affects Medicaid rules
requiring that payments for waiver services (like other Medicaid services) be consistent.
Separating the OHCDS from other CCB roles eliminates this conflict. An alternative, more fully
explored in the conclusions, would have the Department separately solicit entities to organize
one or more OHCDS systems and prohibit service providers from qualifying.
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Monitoring Services
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB is responsible for monitoring implementation of the individualized plan by
provider agencies. This role places discretion within the CCB case manager to enforce a different standard of
quality among service providers.
Existing Safeguards
Oversight Methods
Barriers to Effectiveness
(Italics = proposed)
State requires each CCB to
have a written protocol for case
management monitoring that
addresses general guidelines
established by the Department.

x DDD conducts onsite reviews
of CCB performance, including
review of provider monitoring
activities.

CCBs required to develop a
monitoring tool for use in
assessing performance of area
providers.

x Monitoring tool submitted to
Department.
x Findings of CCB monitoring
submitted to Department and
other CCBs working with the
Service Provider

x No prior review and approval of
monitoring protocol by the
Department.
x State guidance does not address
incentive to favor own providers
x Lack of transparency in monitoring
process.
x Lack of consistency within CCB
service area.
x Service providers subject to multiple
reviews.
x Limited enforcement authority when
problems are found.
x Inconsistent monitoring practices
among CCBs and within their service
network.
x Lack of transparency in results of
monitoring
x Lack of effective enforcement tools
when problems are identified.

Proposed
Safeguard Enhancements
Standard tool and protocol for
x Periodic findings of case
x Lack of transparency
monitoring IP implementation
management review submitted
x Incentive to favor own providers
and conducting programmatic
to the Department.
x Lack of consistency across CCBs in
reviews
monitoring practices.
Proposed Design Features:
x Include peers or independent case manager when monitoring IP implementation at the CCB’s own service
providers.
x No longer allow case management agency to provide direct services.

An essential role of case management is to assure the quality, appropriateness and timeliness of
services identified in the IP. This task requires case managers to review the performance of all
service providers, including the CCB’s own.
Colorado’s current safeguard results in inconsistency across CCBs and imposes no rigorous
standard on the role of the case manager when monitoring services delivered by CCB providers.
The establishment of a standard tool and protocol, combined with submittal of monitoring
findings to the Department and to other CCBs that may also be working with the service
provider, could enhance safeguards but does not limit the potential for bias.
Wyoming’s use of area resource specialists (ARS) is one approach for neutralizing this situation.
The state-employed ARS periodically attends IP meetings to monitor plan implementation. The
Department also conducts random samples of a participant’s services to assess compliance with
the terms of the plan of care.
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One design feature separates direct service from the role of case management, thus eliminating
the conflict. Another optional design feature requires the addition of peers or an independent
case manager whenever a CCB case manager monitors services within his or her own agency.
We expect this option would be cumbersome to implement and potentially unrealistic given the
frequency with which this situation arises.
Department rules speak to a programmatic function assumed by the CCB with respect to
overseeing a provider’s overall performance, unrelated to any one IP. Although monitoring tools
are submitted to the Department, there is no formal review and approval process by the
Department. Lack of a standardized template for conducting programmatic monitoring and a
forum for reviewing findings with the Department for possible follow up weakens the impact of
this programmatic review function and its fairness.
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Complaints 8
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB is responsible for establishing a process through which individuals and
family members can voice concerns and expect a speedy and fair resolution. At the same time, the Case
Manager, employed by the agency also providing service, has potential conflicts in acting as a strong,
objective advocate.
Existing Safeguards
Oversight Methods
Barriers to Effectiveness
(Italics = proposed)
Self advocacy or through
x Participant survey to assess
x Not everyone is comfortable or has
guardians or family members
willingness to complain
the ability to advocate
x Reluctance or fear of retaliation
Professional advocates (e.g.,
x Participant survey to assess
x Ability to access advocate when
ARC, The Legal Center)
how to access professional
needed
advocates
State standards governing the
x Routine collection of CCB
x Case manger’s ability to act as
CCB’s complaint process.
complaint logs to assess
advocate for individual against
trends and timely resolution
employer
x CCB’s neutrality in responding to
complaint.
CCBs are required to maintain
x Routine collection of CCB
x No standard format for tracking
and analyze a complaint log to
complaint logs to assess
complaints
determine trends and need for
trends and timely resolution
x No standard plain language
system improvement.
x DDD conducts onsite reviews
guidance to participants on how to
of CCB performance,
voice complaints
including review of complaint x Reluctance or fear of retaliation to
log and responses
make complaint to CCB
x Department conducts
investigations on complaints
brought to its attention
Rule/policy protecting
x Participant survey to
x No written process/protocol has
individuals against retaliation
assess participant fear
been implemented
of retaliation
Proposed
Safeguard Enhancements
Plain language brochure on
how to voice complaints
Case manager training/protocol
on how to respond to complaint
and document.

x Participant survey to assess
participant understanding of
complaint process
x Survey of case managers to
determine their
x understanding of their role in
handling complaints.

x Case manager turnover
x Requires promotion at all levels of
the CCB
x Case manager’s independence from
the CCB.

Proposed Design Features:
x Establish an independent pathway or ombuds program for voicing complaints.
x Augment existing complaint system with opportunity to complain directly to the Department.

Active complaint systems are considered by many as the hallmark of a good quality management
program in that (when functioning effectively) they provide a timely means for detecting and
remedying quality problems. Existing safeguards provide no uniform check and balance on how
8

Complaint Systems are distinct from the two formal dispute resolution mechanisms available to persons with
developmental disabilities through the Medicaid Fair Hearing Process or the Dispute Resolution System.
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well complaint systems are working within the CCBs or aggregate trends across CCBs. Nor do
they offer formal recourse for voicing concerns outside of the CCB.
Ohio requires their County MRDD Boards to submit all complaints to the State for review.
Wyoming, in addition to complaint systems maintained by local entities, has established a state
process for receiving complaints directly from participants.
Safeguard enhancements may improve access to the complaint system by building participant
awareness of the complaint process. But this improvement does not provide an independent
agent with authority to investigate problems that may involve the CCB. The optional design
feature for establishing an independent pathway for registering and resolving complaints
removes the fear of retaliation and creates an objective and fair atmosphere for resolving
problems but may have access barriers. On the other hand, the development (and promotion) of
a state-sponsored complaint system offers ready access to persons in authority to act on the
problem in a fair and neutral manner.
Incident Reporting System
POTENTIAL CONFLICT: The CCB is responsible for establishing policies and procedures for reporting and
examining incidents and to work to prevent their re-occurrence. In this role, the CCB has the discretion to
minimize incidents or otherwise limit follow-up investigations.
Existing Safeguards
Oversight Methods
Barriers to Effectiveness
(Italics = proposed)
The CCB must establish
x Complaints entered into web-based
x Lack of transparency to the
policies to ensure prompt
reporting system (CIRS) maintained
public
notification of specific events
by the Department including status
x Sufficient state staff to
determined by the State (e.g.,
of all follow up activities made by
adequately follow up on
abuse, neglect, death, serious
the CCB
incidents
injuries) and others identified
x DDD conducts onsite quality
by the CCB.
reviews of CCB performance,
including reviewing of its incident
reporting system, every 3 years
x DDD reviews critical incident
practices on all service agencies at
least every 2 years.
Each CCB is required to have a x DDD reviews HRC activities during x Membership appointed by
Human Rights Committee on
quality onsite reviews (every 3
CCB
issues of abuse, neglect and
years) and during program surveys
x HRC findings only advisory
other serious incidents
of all service agencies (every 2
to CCB
years).
x Information and staff support
x Recommendations of HRC submitted
provided by CCB.
to Department for review.
.
Proposed
Safeguard Enhancements
Guidelines, protocol and forms x Routine reporting via CIRS of all
for submitting root cause
required root cause analyses.
analyses via the State’s CIRS.
Proposed Design Feature:
x Critical incidents are reported directly to the Department for analysis, investigation and follow up rather
than to the CCBs.
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Effective quality management systems are designed to detect problems quickly, remediate the
individual situation, and determine whether and how system improvements can be made to avoid
their reoccurrence. Critical incident reporting is a major protection within the HCBS system to
assure quick and proper notification and follow up action for the most serious of events affecting
participants.
All four states in our study require the immediate reporting of all critical incidents to the State,
three (OH, SD and VT) via the local entity and one (WY) directly to the State. Vermont is in the
process of developing a system that will provide web-based reporting simultaneously to the local
entity and the State.
Current safeguards have made the Department a more active partner in understanding and
resolving critical events occurring within the system. Recent guidance should help to limit
variations in a CCB’s interpretation of when an event is subject to reporting and the required
accompanying documentation. The system should be accompanied by dedicated Department
personnel to follow up and assure that comprehensive and accurate assessments of the problem
have been made and that systemic changes have been instituted to avoid their reoccurrence in the
future. Unclear in the current guidance is the extent to which the CCB and Department will
work collaboratively to investigate problems. The web-based system does not resolve this
question and, without further directives, may lead to confusion on who is in charge of
determining when adequate remedies have been put into place.
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Structural Safeguards
The Department also has adopted several overarching safeguards designed to reduce the potential
for conflict.
Structural Safeguards

Oversight Methods
(Italics = proposed)

CCB Governing Board
membership

x Review of CCB Bylaws to
determine method of selection

Rules requiring separation of
case management from service
provision.

x DDD conducts onsite quality
reviews of CCB performance,
including review of I&R
activities, on more frequent
basis.
x Log of I&R requests and
actions taken by CCB.
x Participant survey to assess
understanding of available
resources
x Findings of designation
process.

Annual designation of CCB
Two-way Agreement between
DDD and CCB specifies
conflict of interest standards

x CCB required to submit to
Department written code of
standards
x CCB required to submit to
Department disclosure
statement

Barriers to Effectiveness
x No required public process for
selection of board.
x Independence of Board members
from influence of CCB Executive
Director
x Independence of CCB Executive
Director from influence of Board
members
x CCB and service providers have
same name and location
x Public perception does not
recognize organizational
distinctions

x Opportunity for public input into
designation process
x Variability across CCB on how
standards are implemented
x Does not address multiple roles
served by CCB and potential for
conflict.

Proposed
Safeguard Enhancement
x Enhance transparency of
designation process and
operations of CCB.

Current structural standards all have barriers to their effectiveness and offer minimal guidance on
the fundamental question of conflict as it plays out in the daily operation of the CCB. Despite
the presence of these structural safeguards, potential conflicts continue to exist. Underlying our
analysis of structural standards is the question of transparency and the process used to engage the
broader community in decisions with respect to the organization and operations of a CCB. Each
of the above safeguard enhancements also could include an opportunity for public disclosure
and/or input. In our CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS we examine in detail proposed
design features to alter the current structure.
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J CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We conclude this report with a synthesis of our findings that can serve as a framework for the
Department as it moves forward. We identify a series of strategies for addressing the conflicts of
interest inherent to the existing delivery system, with varying degrees of effectiveness:


The first set of strategies are the least disruptive to the existing delivery system but are
also the least likely to effectively safeguard against conflicts of interest. This set of
recommendations assumes the CCB continues to play the same roles it does currently but
would minimize the opportunity for acting on a conflict of interest by imposing standards
for requiring greater consistency and accountability.



The second set of strategies considers a range of design options, separating out some of
the roles currently fulfilled by the CCB. In all of these options, at a minimum, the direct
service role is separated from the case management and single entry point role. These
design options impose different levels of disruption on the system but are also the most
likely to be effective at minimizing the potential for a conflict of interest.



The third set of strategies are not directly related to the multiple roles played by the CCB
but have a significant impact on the quality of services. These issues were surfaced in
our discussion with stakeholders and information we gathered from other states. We
include them here because of their potential benefit to the Department.

Moving forward with any of these strategies must involve careful consideration of the costs and
consequences relative to the expected benefit. We heard the same theme from many families:
“Do not fix a problem for someone else by creating problems for me. Do not add an extra
administrative cost that means less money for services. If it’s not broke, don’t fix it!” For
example, equitable access to services suggests greater standardization in the eligibility and
budgeting process. Greater standardization, however, can (but does not always) mean less
flexibility to individualized services.
While the Department may be reluctant to disrupt what is working well, it may find compelling
reasons to do so. We suggest a balancing test, where any remedy for a conflict is weighed
against its cost and disruption to the system. If the scope and severity of a problem is minor,
ideally the cost and consequence of the remedy should be minor. However, if the problem has a
significant negative impact on quality, the cost of the remedy will have more justification.
Weighing the costs and benefits of the status quo against a proposed remedy involves a range of
competing priorities. The Department also needs to balance local control (familiarity and
responsiveness to the local community) and state level interests in equity, minimizing
inconsistent and duplicative burden on participants and providers; and compliance with state and
federal law.
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Deciding what weight to give competing priorities is a judgment call, 9 ideally based on
information and stakeholder input. We do not have all of the information (e.g., impact on cost)
or stakeholder input that are needed to draw definitive conclusions.
Incremental Strategies to Reduce Conflict or Strengthen State Oversight
In our identification of incremental strategies, we focused on aspects of the program that did not
require statutory changes, major expenditures or significant implementation time but which
could strengthen program quality and oversight to safeguard against conflicts of interest. 10
These strategies were identified with the pending waiver renewals in mind as an opportunity to
move forward in the near term.
Develop Comprehensive Operational Protocols for Waiver Programs
The multiple roles served by the CCB and related opportunities for conflict heighten the need for
the Department to be particularly clear about its expectations. The current system allows
significant discretion by the CCB to conduct its business contrary to the goals of the program.
We believe that the Department cannot preserve the current structure without being more
prescriptive about program operations and expectations.
A major task for DDD and Medicaid staff is to thoroughly document current waiver policies and
practices in a format that is easily accessible to program managers, CCBs, provider agencies and
program participants. Clear and unambiguous language should be used to identify the
operational protocol for CCBs, including required processes, tools and documentation, in the
implementation of waiver policy. Experience in other states indicates that the preparation of a
waiver renewal application is a good opportunity to conduct this exercise and to involve
stakeholders in its review.
In earlier sections of this report, we identified safeguard enhancements, many of which could be
addressed through an Operational Protocol. Some of these may be more easily implemented than
others. While we do not have adequate information for assessing the viability of implementing
the following enhancements in the short term, they are listed below for the Department’s
consideration:






Handling and documentation of requests for information and referral
Guidelines for preventing the CCB from promoting its own service agency at the
exclusion of others
Criteria for administration of the waiting list
Composition and documentation of an inter-disciplinary team (IDT)
Methods and tools for use by case managers in monitoring implementation of
individualized plans

9

At least where there is discretion. Compliance with federal or state law, for example, would have greater weight
than the cost and availability of services.
10
This report assessed the design and operation of Colorado’s waiver programs for persons with disabilities at a
point in time. Our description of the waiver program came largely from rules, policies and documents gathered
during our study period. We understand from the Department that substantial changes were made subsequent to our
study period. Consequently, some of the strategies proposed in this section may already have been proposed or
implemented.
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Review and approval of monitoring tools for CCB oversight of service providers within
OHCDS
Policy or guidance on retaliation 11
Investigation and analysis of critical incidents by the CCB
Protocol for provider referral and selection process

Document Oversight Methods and Quality Indicators used by the Department to assess CCB
Performance
The potential for conflict due to the multiple roles of the CCB creates the need for greater
accountability to assure that standards for quality are met. It is not sufficient to establish
standards in an Operational Protocol; the Department must design and implement methods for
assessing CCB performance against the standards on an ongoing basis. Under the present
system, state oversight is the mechanism for restoring confidence that the program is working as
intended and that consistent standards for monitoring and improving performance are applied
across the State.
Our conversations with CMS underscored the importance of documenting in detail how the State
routinely detects and addresses problems. Ohio in particular was identified as having
documented its discovery methods and data sources for each major waiver function and
assurance. We concur with CMS on the importance of aligning oversight tools, methods and
measures with CCB functions, including quality indicators, responsible entity and frequency of
oversight. This seems especially relevant given the substantial changes that have and are
occurring within the Department with respect to its oversight methods and the pending waiver
renewals.
Listed below are oversight methods identified in previous sections that were proposed for
development or improvement:










State-sponsored participant survey to assess experience under the waiver program (see
previous section for specific areas identified for inclusion)
State-sponsored survey of case managers to assess their experience in providing case
management services under the waiver
Documentation and reporting of information and referral requests and actions
Documentation and reporting of waiting list decisions and rationale
Written acknowledgement by participant that the case manager has reviewed all service
options
Written acknowledgement of provider referral and selection process
Submittal and review of recommendations of the Human Rights Committee
Focused review of level of care determinations
Standard tool for monitoring IP implementation

Enhance the Visibility and Leadership Role of Medicaid and DDD
The discretion of the CCB to act in ways that place private interests over public interests
undermines the integrity of the program and its accountability to the Department. A perception
11

The Department cites a technical assistance paper, Handling Consumer Complaints: Pushing the Service Quality
Envelope, Growing Quality Services (March 2001), as guidance on identifying and preventing retaliation. This
document provides a thoughtful analysis of retaliation and suggested strategies for responding to complaints.
However, as technical assistance rather than policy, we do not view this document as regulating CCB behavior.
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held by many stakeholders is that CCBs are the arbiters of how waiver policy is implemented, as
illustrated by variations across CCBs in how core processes are conducted (e.g., selection of
qualified providers to meet a participant’s needs).
We encourage the Department to exert its authority and oversight of the waiver programs in
more tangible and visible ways so that variations in practice are minimized and accountability is
centralized. The development of Operational Protocols and oversight methods are steps in this
direction. In addition, the Department could sponsor training programs or communicate directly
with providers and consumers on issues of statewide concern. Areas identified in our study
include:





Training to enhance consistent interpretation of criteria for determining Level of Care
Training on the development of individualized plans and provider selection process
Training on handling and documenting complaints
Plain language brochure for consumers on how to voice concerns and make complaints

Move Towards a More Transparent System
Lack of transparency in how the system works and performs may be contributing to frustrations
expressed by providers and parents. We believe that Operational Protocols and documentation
of oversight methods and processes will be an initial step in reducing ambiguities in people’s
perceptions of how the program is intended to work. Disclosure of audit findings and
performance assessments may be another opportunity to inform stakeholders of the Department’s
commitment to a fair and comprehensive quality oversight system and to engage them in the
design of improvement initiatives.
Options for System Re-design
We do not anticipate that the safeguards identified in the previous section will eliminate the
opportunity for conflict, given the many roles of the CCB. Most of the safeguards we identified
monitor, but do not prevent, the exercise of a conflict of interest. The compounded effect of the
CCB’s multiple roles is still likely to confuse participants, families, and even the CCBs, on
which hat the CCB is wearing at any given point in time (especially when the CCB is co-located
and shares a name with its provider agencies). In addition, the ability of participants, families
and providers to challenge a CCB – an important check on the CCB’s ability to act on a conflict
– is inhibited when so much control rests in the hands of the CCB. In this section we present
three design options aimed at eliminating, reducing or mitigating the potential for conflict by
reducing the number of roles the CCB plays. At a minimum, all of these options separate direct
service from other roles currently performed by the CCB. 12 Under each option, we examine
potential costs and barriers as well as potential benefits.

12

Some have suggested that pursuing a less intrusive design option, in which the Department would contract with
an independent case management agency, other than a CCB, to serve those people who would like an alternative to
the CCB in their service area. This option appears to invite some of the same opportunities for conflict of interest
that already exist: As the single entry point to services, the CCB is likely to have the same incentive to limit access
to information about a competing case management agency. Alternatively, it is has the same incentive to refer
difficult to serve participants to its competition.
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Option 1: Direct Service Separated from Other Roles
The role that most compromises the ability of the CCB to be seen and to act as a neutral agent in
the performance of its functions under the waiver program is the provision of direct services.
Option 1 would separate direct service provision from other functions performed by the CCB.
All service provision would occur through an organized health care delivery system and/or direct
contracts with providers. The organizational entity serving as the CCB would maintain its
current role as the single entry point and case management provider, or opt to provide direct
services, but not both.
Option 1

DDD

CCB

SPOE

CM

Referral

Provider
Contracts

Referral

Individual
Providers

Description: Maintains status quo but removes direct service provision from the CCB. CCB contracts
with individual providers and/or establishes organized health care delivery system for direct service
provision.
Potential Costs and Barriers
x Viability of providing a full range of direct services outside the infrastructure of the CCB, especially
in rural areas.
x Viability of providing single point of entry and case management services at the CCB without service
provision revenue.
x Disruption in service provision; confusion among participants during transition
Potential Benefits
x Eliminates conflicts resulting from CCB’s role as SPOE/direct service provider and case
manager/direct service provider.
x Maintains CCB role in assuring adequacy of provider network to meet participant needs within a local
area.
x Strengthens the focus of the CCB in serving as SPOE and case manager
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Option 2: Provider Contracts (OHCDS) and Direct Service Separated From Other Roles
The second option for redesign de-couples the CCB from all provider contracts and limits its role
to referral for service delivery. Under this option, the Department would enter into direct
contractual relationships with one or more organized health care delivery systems to provide
direct services under its waiver programs. The organizational entity serving as the CCB would
maintain its current role as the single entry point and case management provider, or opt to serve
as the OHCDS/direct service provider, but not both.
Option 2
DDD

CCB

SPOE

Referral

CM

OHCDS

Referral

Individual
Providers

Description: Removes CCB from contracting for direct service provision. The Department
separately enters into contracts with one or more organized health care delivery system to
provide services under the waiver.
Potential Costs and Barriers
x Viability of providing single point of entry and case management services at the CCB
without service provision revenue.
x Disruption in service provision; confusion among participants during transition
Potential Benefits
x Administrative cost savings through consolidation of OHCDS function.
x Greater opportunity for standardization in quality oversight of service providers.
x Strengthens independence of CCB role in overseeing implementation of service plan.
x Strengthens the focus of the CCB in serving as SPOE and case manager.

35

Muskie School of Public Service

Option 3: All Roles Separate
Options 1 and 2 alter the role of the CCB but guarantee an ongoing role of the CCB in programs
providing home and community based services to persons with developmental disabilities.
Option 3 makes no such assumption, leaving the delivery of SPOE, case management and
service provision to a competitive bidding process. The Department would establish qualifying
criteria.
Option 3
DDD

SPOE

Referral

CM

Referral

OHCDS

Referral

Individual
Providers

Description: Department competitively bids for SPOE, case management and OHCDS functions.
Department determines qualifying criteria and number of entities for each function.
Potential Costs and Barriers
x Viability of providing single point of entry and case management services without service
provision revenue.
x Disruption in service provision; confusion among participants during transition
x Lack of local control.
Potential Benefits
x Removes conflicts inherent to multiple roles served by CCB
x Administrative cost savings through consolidation of functions.
x Greater opportunity for standardization in quality oversight of service providers.

36

Muskie School of Public Service

Issues outside the Scope of the Study
In our conversations with stakeholders we identified a series of other issues that may contribute
to tensions connected to the CCBs’role. While these issues are not directly related to a conflict
of interest, we highlight them here for consideration by the Department as it looks to strengthen
the system of services for persons with developmental disabilities.


The lack of a consumer-directed model that enhances consumer choice and control over
services exacerbates frustration with the CCBs. Greater consumer choice and control can
itself be a safeguard. We understand that the Department’s efforts to introduce greater
choice and control were delayed by state legislation. We encourage the Department to
move forward with its plans.



We heard from a number of stakeholders frustrated by the control their CCB exerts over
local service options and their lack of influence and voice. We encourage the
Department to revisit the statutory and regulatory requirement that the CCB develop a
long-range plan for the development and coordination of services and supports. The plan
is to be developed “through collaborative community efforts.” Few of the stakeholders
we asked were familiar with this plan or the required annual public forums for updating
the plan. The planning process may be a missed opportunity for engaging in public
dialogue regarding new directions for the service system. Defining expectations for the
components of the plan and updates, as well as the “collaborative community efforts” and
the required annual public forum could provide an opportunity for great public voice in
delivery system design, providing a chance for participants and families to shape services
that are more responsive to the needs and preferences of the people served.



We heard several comments on the quality of case management services that suggest
opportunities for improvement. For example, one parent mentioned that information and
referral should include more “generic,” or not DD, supports (e.g., the YMCA) that
promote inclusion and integration. Others expressed their concern that, while a CCB is
required to provide information and referral to all services and supports, some case
managers only refer people to those funded through DDD. People on waiting lists must
find their own way to housing supports (e.g., Section 8) and vocational rehabilitation
services. As the Department establishes its operational protocol, it may wish to consider
greater specificity in the definition of the case management function.



Mil-levy funding was raised in our stakeholder meetings as a major support for
enhancing services to a community’s population with developmental disabilities and was
viewed by others as creating service disparities across the State given that not all CCBs
have access to this funding. Some questioned whether mil-levies were being used to
subsidize a CCB’s own service providers rather than support all persons in the
community with developmental disabilities as required by legislation.



Stakeholders expressed concern that the Adult Protective Service system is inadequate to
meet the need of the population, causing them to defer to the CCB for investigations.
CCBs confirmed that they were having to step in where APS lacked the resources to
adequately respond to problems.
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Appendix A

J Reference Documents
Colorado Statutes, Title 27, Article 10.5.
Developmental Disabilities Services Rule 16.
Health Care Policy and Financing Medical Assistance Staff Manual, §§8.400–401;
§§8.402-8.416; §8.500, §8.760
Interagency Agreement between Department of Health Care Policy and Financing and
the Department of Human Services (July 1, 2006).
3-Way Contract Template between Department of Health Care Policy and Financing; the
Department of Human Services, Division of Developmental Disabilities, and Community
Centered Boards (contract period of July1, 2007 to June 30, 2008).
Program Quality Standards for On Site Surveys: CCB Administration and Case
Management Services, with Interpretive Guidelines. Division of Developmental
Disabilities, Office of Adult, Disability and Rehabilitation Services, Colorado
Department of Human Services (Revised December 2001).
DDD Complaint Policy.
DDD Guidelines: Management of Waiting Lists (Revised January 1995).
DDD Policy: Conducting an Effective Evidentiary Meeting as Part of the Developmental
Disabilities System’s Dispute Resolution Process (September 2000).
Directive Memorandum to CCB Directors re service denial policies, DDD (March 27,
2001).
Directive Memorandum to CCB Directors re revised statewide program approval process
(March 26, 2007).
Advisory Memorandum to CCB Directors, DDD re critical incident reporting system
(December 4, 2006)
Letter to Cindi Stetson, Office of the State Auditor, State of Colorado from Fred L.
DeCresentis, Director, Division of Developmental Disabilities (February 15, 2007).
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Letter from Fred DiCrescentis, Director, Division of Developmental Disabilities to
Barbara Prehmus, Director, Medical Assistance Office, Department of Health Care
Policy & Finance (April 23, 2007).
Letter from Barbara Prehmus, Director, Medical Assistance Office, Department of Health
Care Policy & Finance, to Diana Friedli, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(March 21, 2007).
Handling Consumer Complaints: Pushing the Service Quality Envelope, Growing
Quality Services, Division of Developmental Disabilities, Office of Adult, Disability and
Rehabilitation Services, Colorado Department of Human Services (March 2001)
Strategic Plan: 2003-2008 for the Colorado Developmental Disabilities Service System
Division of Developmental Disabilities, Office of Adult, Disability and Rehabilitation
Services, Colorado Department of Human Services (July 1, 2003).
Special Report to the Joint Budget Committee on the History of Community Centered
Boards and the History of the Controversy Surrounding Separation of Case Management
(or Managed Care Duties) From Direct Service Provision, Developmental Disabilities
Services, Office of Health and Rehabilitation Services, Colorado Department of Human
Services (January 18, 1996).
Report from Legislative Audit Committee (1987)
Memorandum from Colorado Legislative Council Staff to Interim Committee on Longterm Care Services and Supports for Persons with Developmental Disabilities. (August
29, 2007).
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Appendix B
Review of Select State Practices Pertaining to Potential Conflicts
Ohio

South Dakota

Vermont

Wyoming

Individual Options Waiver

Comprehensive DD Waiver

Waiver for Persons with DD

Adult DD Waiver

Program Overview
88 County Boards are the primary
agents of the MRDD waiver’s
administration. County MRDD
Boards provide intake and referral,
case management, program
planning, some direct services, and
monitoring of plan implementation
within the county. Persons applying
for the waiver must select a Support
Services Administrator (SSA)
employed by the County Board.

The SD Division of Developmental
Disabilities certifies 19 non-profit
Adjustment Training Centers (ATC)
to provide case management and, at
a minimum, day habilitation services
to persons with mental retardation or
developmental disabilities within a
defined geographic area. ATCs are
required to be re-certified by the
State no less often than every 2
years.
Each consumer must have a
designated service coordinator
responsible for monitoring the
implementation of a service plan. If
the service coordinator is
responsible for any direct
implementation of the consumer’s
plan, another service coordinator or
staff member, designated by the
ATC, shall conduct quarterly
observations of those services.
A pilot project is underway to
develop an independent case
management option external to the
provider network.

10 Designated Agencies (DA) are
responsible for ensuring needed
services are available for persons
with developmental disabilities in
Vermont. The DA is responsible for
local planning, service coordination
and monitoring outcomes of the
region they serve. DAs must
provide services directly or contract
with other providers to deliver
supports and services. DA is
responsible for intake and referral,
assessing individual needs and
assignment funding, developing
support plan, providing regional
crisis response services, and
providing or arranging for
comprehensive service network
within its region.

The WY Developmental Disabilities
Division purchases services for
persons with developmental
disabilities from programs that
provide case management, direct
service or both. A core group of
programs are accredited by the
Commission on Accreditation of
Rehabilitation Facilities (CARF) and
provide both case management and
direct services.
Area Resource Specialists (ARS)
work for the State to provide initial
assistance to consumers in accessing
waivers; assure freedom of choice in
selecting a case manager from list
provided by the State; attend plan of
care meetings, and be the contact on
local level to address concerns.

In addition 5 Specialized Service
Agencies (SSA) have been
designated to provide distinctive,
specialized services.
Re-designation of DA and SSA is
conducted every 4 years by the State
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Ohio

South Dakota

Vermont

Wyoming

Individual Options Waiver

Comprehensive DD Waiver

Waiver for Persons with DD

Adult DD Waiver

Level of Care (LOC) Determination
County MRDD Bds complete initial
assessment packet for waiver
enrollment. Eligibility Unit in
Medicaid reviews assessments and
recommends formal LOC
determination.

Using standardized ICAP form,
ATC submits data for LOC
determination for State approval.
ICAP is part of the information used
by State to also determine rate
within which service plan is
developed.

LOC review conducted by DA and
approved by State.

The Case Manager schedules the
ICAP screen which is conducted by
state contractor and assembles
information for LOC and waiver
eligibility determination. Information
is submitted to State for review and
approval.

Service Planning, Funding and Monitoring
The SSA is responsible for
completing the OH Developmental
Disabilities Tool (ODDP) that
generates a standardized score based
on service needs. The ODDP links
the assessment to a funding range
that allows individuals with similar
needs to access comparable waiver
services throughout the State. An
Individual Service Plan is developed
by the SSA, with no prescribed tool
required. The ISP process identifies
the actual services needed by the
individual, and develops a funding
level based on the funding range.
The SSA monitors implementation
of the service plan.

ATC case manager develops and
approves plans of care within
funding levels established by the
State. No prescribed service plan
tool required although policies on its
content established.

Service planning and funding level
determined by DA using a standard
assessment tool. DA responsible for
monitoring service plan
implementation. Funding levels
>$100,000 approved by State.

Case manager is responsible for the
development of the plan of care,
subject to State approval, and ongoing
monitoring of plan implementation.
Funding levels determined by State. A
State Extraordinary Care Committee
can authorize funding for emergency
requests.
ARS periodically attends plan of care
meetings to monitor plan
implementation process.
Survey/Certification staff review
random sample of participants’
services to assess implementation of
plans of care.
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Ohio

South Dakota

Vermont

Wyoming

Individual Options Waiver

Comprehensive DD Waiver

Waiver for Persons with DD

Adult DD Waiver

Freedom of Choice of Providers
State rules require individuals to
have access to contact information
about all certified provides; website
being modified to include userfriendly provider info for consumers
and families.

Providers are required to provide
consumer with a list of available
providers of interest to the consumer
whether at host ATC or other
provider.

State conducts quarterly reviews of
sample service plans to confirm that
individuals are afforded choice of
providers and case manager conform
to state requirements associated with
consumer choice of provider.

The DA must help consumers learn
about service options, including all
providers in the region that can
respond to their needs. The
recipient may choose to receive
services from any certified provider.
If the DA disagrees with the choice,
the consumer is notified and the
Director of the State DD Division
reviews the issue and makes a final
decision.

Case manager provides consumer
with current service provider list. The
consumer signs a “Notice of Choice”
document to confirm that he/she has
been informed of choices available.
Case manager required to review
provider options with individual and
confirm preferred choice every 6 mos.

Governance of Sub-State Entity
Composition of County MRDD
Boards determined by the county.

Each ATC must adopt bylaws that
provide for a rotating board of
directors; establish term limits not to
exceed 3 years and no more than 3
consecutive terms; provide
opportunity for consumers and
family members to be on the board;
provide that members of the board
serve without pay; and provide that
no financial benefit accrue as a
result of membership on the board.

Majority of Board members are
comprised of consumers and family
members. Composition of the
Board is confirmed by
organization’s independent audit.

No requirements for required
composition

Local Program Standing Committee
(a minimum of 5 members, majority
of which are consumers and family
members – and 25% must be
consumers) reports to the Board and
is responsible for: hiring key
management of DA, quality
assessment, and development of
local system of care plan.
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Ohio

South Dakota

Vermont

Wyoming

Individual Options Waiver

Comprehensive DD Waiver

Waiver for Persons with DD

Adult DD Waiver

Quality Management and Improvement
The State is moving toward a datadriven quality management system
with participation by local agents
and consumers.
A State Quality Management
Advisory Council (QMAC) guides
the development and
implementation of a Quality
Management system for the MRDD
waivers. Using data reported by
County MRDD Bds,
recommendations for system
changes will be made.

ATC must apply a Life Quality
Review process for maximizing an
individual’s outcomes in the areas of
choice, relationships, lifestyle,
health and well being, rights and
satisfaction.

All service providers are required to
have internal Quality Management
Plans approved by State and
demonstrated data information
systems to properly assess and
report performance. DAs and SSAs
are reviewed every 2 years.

No specific provider level quality
management program required.

The QMAC will help design data
reporting requirements for County
MRDD Bds that may in the future
be reported publicly.
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Ohio

South Dakota

Vermont

Wyoming

Individual Options Waiver

Comprehensive DD Waiver

Waiver for Persons with DD

Adult DD Waiver

Incidents are reported to the County
MRDD Bd which reports the
information to the State. County
MRDD Boards are responsible for
immediate action, investigations,
and prevention planning for each
incident.
The State Major Unusual Incident
and Registry Unit reviews all
critical incidents. The State
provides TA to providers and
counties and conducts annual
assessment of each County MRDD
Board’s incident response system.

The ATC must submit an incident
report to the State within 48 hours or
the next working day whichever
occurs first of becoming aware of the
incident. The Division of
Developmental Disabilities conducts
investigations and sometimes
receives assistance from the
protection and advocacy agency. A
report on aggregate incident data is
published annually by the State.

The County MRDD Bd must have a
complaint resolution process that
includes the submittal of complaints
to the Director of the State Office of
MRDD.

Each provider is required to inform
each participant at their annual
meeting that if they have any
questions, they can contact the
division.

The Medicaid office administers the
state hearing process and analyzes
requests for hearings to identify the
frequency and types of requests.

The ATC must have a grievance
process approved by State that allows
an individual to appeal any decision
or action by the ATC that affects the
individual. Aggregate data regarding
grievances is not collected at this
time.

Critical Incident Reporting
Critical incidents received over past
2 yrs are examined prior to Quality
Service Review to identify trends
and areas for improvement.
Web-based reporting system under
development.

Critical incidents are reported to
State via electronic incident
reporting system. Regional
Survey/Certification Unit
required to review and conduct
incident investigations as needed.

Complaints and Grievances
Plain language brochures on How to
File a Complaint and How to Appeal
A Decision are broadly
disseminated. [Note: these brochures
are currently being revised in
accordance with new regulations.]
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Grievance policy addresses issues of
confidentiality, retaliation, and
mediation.
Grievance data received over past 2
yrs is examined prior to agency
Quality Services Review.

Providers required to have
complaint process with
timeframes for response. In
addition, the State has its own
process for receiving complaints
directly and maintains data base
for tracking resolution.
Providers are not required to
submit complaint log to State.
State reviews provider complaint
process during onsite reviews.
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Ohio

South Dakota

Vermont

Wyoming

Individual Options Waiver

Comprehensive DD Waiver

Waiver for Persons with DD

Adult DD Waiver

Oversight of Entity
The State conducts comprehensive
field reviews of each waiver at least
as often as the waiver comes up for
federal renewal. Based on face-toface interviews and record reviews for
samples of about 400 consumers, the
State assesses performance and
compliance in regard to all federal
waiver requirements, issues reports,
and requests corrective actions if
needed.

Biennial reviews conducted by
State to assess conformance of
ATC with state requirements.
Biennial surveys also include a
medical and programmatic review
for 5% of enrolled individuals.

State team (including at least 1
consumer) conducts Quality
Services Review of DA every 2
years thru consumer interviews,
record reviews, observation and
discussions with agency staff. DA
required to submit Quality Action
Plan according to state-defined
template.

State Survey/Certification Unit is
responsible for completing initial
certification of new providers and
annual recertification of waiver
providers.
In addition, agencies are subject to
CARF review every 1-3 years based
on findings. Findings of CARF
review submitted to the State for
follow up on issues pertaining to
health, safety and individual rights.

Quarterly reviews of a sample of
service plans to assess adequacy,
completeness and appropriate
implementation.
The State monitors and accredits
County MRDD Boards; accreditation
is given for period of from 1 to 5
years. The State also certifies and
registers county board employees;
certifies HCBS providers; and
licenses residential facilities.
The State delegates responsibility for
some provider compliance monitoring
to county MRDD Bds; however, if
the county board identifies any
concerns during monitoring activities,
the State is notified, reviews the
concerns, and issues any findings or
citations that are warranted.
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Ohio

South Dakota

Vermont

Wyoming

Individual Options Waiver

Comprehensive DD Waiver

Waiver for Persons with DD

Adult DD Waiver

County MRDD Bds must submit a
corrective action plan in response to
issues identified in the accreditation
review. Service providers are
required to submit corrective action
plans as a result of issues identified
in the State’s compliance review.

The State requires the ATC to have
a Quality Life Review conducted by
the State or the Council on Quality
and Leadership. The review focuses
on a sample (2/3 selected by State;
1/3 selected by ATC) of individuals
to determine presence of desired
outcomes. At least 17 of the total 25
outcomes must be met for recertification. All 19 providers are
accredited by CQL. The ATC must
submit a Plan of Enhancement to
State specifying actions to findings
of biennial review and Life Quality
Review.

The State is coordinating the
development of an interagency set of
waiver performance measures which
will become a basis to examine
performance across waivers and
over time, to identify and replicate
best practices, etc.

The State publishes an annual report
showing aggregate findings of the
performance of its waiver programs.

Quality Improvement Plans
State staff assists service providers
in development and implementation
of Quality Action Plans resulting
from Quality Services Review.
TA also given to help providers and
consumers (who self direct) develop
internal quality management
strategies.

A quality improvement plan is
required for each recommendation
made during a provider certification
including action steps, responsible
parties, and dates of completion for
each recommendation
Surveyor/Certification staff are
responsible for review and tracking of
QIPs. .

Public Reporting
Agency-specific results of CARF and
State reviews published on the
website.

B7

Muskie School of Public Service

Ohio

South Dakota

Vermont

Wyoming

Individual Options Waiver

Comprehensive DD Waiver

Waiver for Persons with DD

Adult DD Waiver

Waiting lists are managed at the
county level. Counties
are responsible for inputting waiting
list data into a State database.

There is a minimal waiting list that
is managed by the State. The State
reports that they usually know which
providers have openings or funding
available to serve someone and have
ready means for locating services for
people in crisis situations.

Waiting Lists
Each DA maintains a waiting list.
The State specifies criteria for
waiting list and requires the DA to
submit monthly updates via a secure
website to assure appropriate
allocations.
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The State maintains a central waiting
list. Rules require that the State
alternate between funding the person
with the most severe needs based on
their service and funding the person
who has been on the waiting list the
longest.
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Ohio

South Dakota

Vermont

Wyoming

Individual Options Waiver

Comprehensive DD Waiver

Waiver for Persons with DD

Adult DD Waiver

Consumers participate on the State
Quality Management Advisory
Council (QMAC) and are otherwise
involved in waiver renewals and
grant activities pertaining to the
waiver program.

The State has program workgroups
involving consumers. In addition,
consumers participate in designing a
pilot project to develop a method to
offer consumers a choice with
service coordination.

Stakeholder Involvement
State Program Standing Committee
appointed by Governor includes 915 members (majority are disclosed
consumers and family members).
Responsible for hiring key state
management, evaluation of quality,
development of State System of
Care Plan, Policy, Review of
aggregate complaints and grievances
for trends.
Majority of members of Local (DA)
Program Standing Committee must
be consumers or family members.
DA must document
consumer/family inclusion in
reviews of services delivered,
requests for services, quality
monitoring, and evaluation of
agency program effectiveness.
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The Division has an Advisory Council
that includes representatives from the
regional service providers,
independent providers,
participants/family members,
Governor’s Planning Council for
People with Developmental
Disabilities, Protection & Advocacy,
Wyoming Institute for Disabilities,
Developmental Preschools and the
Department of Education. The
Council meets at least twice a year
and reviews the Division’s strategic
plan, suggests changes to rules,
regulations and policies, and reviews
aggregate data on the service delivery
system to identify gaps and make
recommendations for changes.
Division has a Working Group
process where stakeholders are
invited to participate in working
groups that work on
development/updating of rules,
changes to current procedures or
forms, and other special projects.
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J Summary of Stakeholder Input
The following narrative summarizes information gathered through:
x

A series of face-to-face interviews with ARC representatives, CCB trade associations,
CCBs, parents, and participants conducted in Colorado, August 22 and 23, 2007.

x

Phone conversations with parents, case managers, provider representatives, Colorado’s
protection and advocacy organization over the month of September.

x

Email communications from parents and some providers received during the month of
September.

This summary should be read with the understanding that we do not know the answers to the
following questions:
x

Are the comments we received a fair representation of the views held by participants,
parents, providers, etc.? In fact, it is unlikely that the experience of the participants we
interviewed fully represent the typical experience of the people served by CCBs. In
particular, we expect that many of the participants we met with had a relatively low level
of service need; their relationship with their CCB is therefore likely to be less intensive
than other participants might experience. In addition, many of the participants we met
with received state funded, not Medicaid funded services.
We also heard concerns that some people are afraid to express their opinion for fear of
retaliation. In addition, some parents questioned whether the process for soliciting input
was selective.

x

Are the positive and negative comments predominantly connected to just a subset of
CCBs or can they be generalized across many? A number of people we talked to,
including advocates and CCB representatives, seemed to agree that the problems
identified were associated with only three or four CCBs, although we do not know if they
agreed on which CCBs. We also heard complimentary comments about particular CCBs.

x

Is the information gathered an accurate representation of a problem, or is it skewed by
that person’s understanding of the problem? There may be cases where we can answer
this question but not generally.

Keep What’s Working
We heard from many parents that any changes to the system should not interfere with what’s
working. Said one parent: “If it works, don’t fix it!”
For many, the system is working well. Many fear how change will impact services that they
depend on. More than one parent shared the view that: “Without the funding we have
received…we would be lost.” Parents were worried about the potential for added costs and
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administrative burden reducing the amount available for services. One person also worried that
the familiarity of existing relationships would be lost if the current system were disrupted.
The CCB as Single Point of Entry
The CCB serves as the single point of entry for people who want to access DD services in their
service area. We asked stakeholders about the advantages and disadvantages of having the CCB
serve as the single entry point to services.
A number of stakeholders identified the positive roles a CCB can play:
x

The CCB is a “soft place to land” for parents just learning that their child has a disability.
Several parents described the valuable role a CCB can play in helping parents adjust.

x

The CCB serves as the “face” of developmental disabilities in their community. One
parent cited the role that the CCB plays in building community connections, with the
CCB as the known point of contact for working with the local community to address
problems affecting the DD population.

x

Also because the CCB is known in the community, a CCB representative noted that
CCBs serve as a primary contact for responding in an emergency situation.

x

Several stakeholders said the advantage of the CCB was having one place to go to get
answers. Some parents mentioned that the CCBs provided access to and information
about the service and provider choices available to them. One parent said “I like having
one central place to coordinate placement, provider organizations, and other services for
those with developmental disabilities.”

x

A case manager suggested that having a single point of entry for developmental disability
services made it easier to coordinate with other single points of entry (e.g., the elderly,
blind, disabled waiver).

CCBs appear to vary in how they comply with the statutory requirement for an annual public
meeting and annual plan. One CCB reported combining the annual public meeting with a
provider fair.
Others questioned whether or not CCBs were visible access points:
x

Several parents thought that entry through the CCB is not obvious for people who are
new to Colorado. (This is compared to a number of parents reporting they were quickly
linked to services when their child was born in Colorado.)

x

One advocate reported that the educational system does not always know to refer to a
CCB; she saw this as a problem given that the educational system is responsible for
educating the school system about how to access services.
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There seemed to be some consensus that the visibility of the CCB, and its effectiveness as a
single entry point depended on whether or not the CCB was located in a rural or urban
community.
People also worried about how much control the CCB had because it served as the single entry
point:
x

One parent said that because the CCBs have a “captive audience” they are not motivated
to provide objective information on available services.

x

One parent said the CCB “limits our options and puts us at the mercy of their
effectiveness and bureaucracy.”

x

A case manager said the downside to having only one entry point in a service area was
being stuck with the “personality” of your CCB.

x

A number of stakeholders said the CCB does not have an incentive to “think outside the
box” to develop creative service solutions.

Stakeholders discussed different strategies for addressing concerns about the CCB’s single entry
point role:
x

The idea of providing independent information and referral was not seen as useful in rural
areas, where the CCB is the only provider. At the same time, one parent suggested that
information and referral should be done by a provider who would make referral to
generic supports (e.g., the YMCA); this parent said when information and referral is
provided by a disability provider, referrals tend to be toward disability-specific services.

x

Several stakeholders, including parents, advocates, and CCB representatives, discussed
the need for other options. In Colorado, if a person is dissatisfied with his or her CCB,
that person can request case management services from another CCB. However, it was
agreed that there were some serious logistical problems associated with that option. First,
the other CCB can deny the request. Also, particularly in rural areas, the closest CCB
can be a long distance away.

Eligibility Determination & Resource Allocation.
The CCB is responsible for determining whether a person is eligible for developmental disability
services. They also administer the level of care assessment for determining whether or not a
person is eligible for waiver services. CCBs are responsible for assessing an individual’s need
for services in order to develop a service plan.
One case manager said that the Level of Care (LOC) determination is subject to interpretation.
Some CCBs are more liberal and others conservative. Some people believe the CCB uses the
eligibility determination process as a tool for screening people out if they are hard to serve. One
advocate said some CCBs are frequently overturned on appeal; while others apply the eligibility
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criteria much more loosely. This advocate speculates that some CCBs are tightening up how
they interpret eligibility to keep down their waiting lists.
CCB representatives reported that the eligibility determination process has recently become
muddied because a number of decisions have been overturned on appeal. The CCBs believe that
their determinations have followed the letter of the law but the administrative law judges (ALJs)
have not. They believe the ALJs need better training or the Department needs to clarify that it
has changed its eligibility criteria.
Many agreed that Colorado’s plans to use a standardized assessment tool for allocating resources
was a positive step in the right direction and would address some concerns around consistency.
Many, including representatives of the CCBs, agreed that administering the SIS should be done
by someone other than the CCB. Advocates believed the CCBs would game the SIS. Some
CCB representatives believe they would be asked to game the SIS or would be accused of
gaming the SIS, and wanted to stay away from that problem.
Advocates, many parents, and some CCB representatives were comfortable with the idea of
taking the functions for eligibility determination, level of care determination and the allocation of
resources out of the CCB. One parent noted that people have to go through the county to apply
for Medicaid anyway, so it makes sense to have the county be the single entry point. (Another
parent had experience with both the Elderly, Blind, Disabled (EBD) waiver and the DDD HCBS
waiver. To this person, access to the EBD waiver system was very concrete and straightforward.
For the DDD waiver, access is more complicated, vague, and “murkier.”)
A number of parents and others worried that reassigning these functions would add another
administrative layer and more costs, creating more bureaucracy and reducing the money for
direct services.
Waiting Lists
A number of stakeholders expressed concern about how waiting lists are managed. Some
perceive the CCB playing favorites, moving board members, employees or favored parents up
the list faster. Some parents were dissatisfied with the case management services available to
them while on the waiting list; that the CCB makes no effort to connect a person to services
outside of those within the CCB’s domain.
The CCBs say that they are not paid to manage waiting lists and are paid very little for case
management services for those on the waiting list.
Some thought that there needed to be more transparency and consistency in the way waiting lists
are managed. The idea of centralizing the management of waiting lists would raise concerns if
that meant that all CCB waiting lists were merged into one: some were concerned that people in
rural areas would essentially be shut out of services, given the higher volume in cities.
Case Management Services
Parents had a lot to say about the quality of case management services. Many parents see their
case manager as having their child’s best interests at heart. A number of people were able to
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describe the personalized and effective role that a case manager had played in addressing their
child’s needs:
x

“The people we dealt with at every level were kind, caring and professional individuals.”

x

“[My son’s case managers] are caring, meticulous and sensitive to the needs of both the
clients and families of the client!”

x

“I find that the case managers for my ward consistently place his needs before those of
the agency by whom they are employed and ensure that the his needs are met, his rights
as an individual are protected and that he is given the opportunity to succeed as an
individual.”

x

[Our CCB] stepped in…and provided very caring, skilled representatives who helped us
navigate some difficult territories.”

x

“[Our care manager] was right there the whole time working with our schedule and
making sure that [our son] received the required help.”

x

“I am certain my life has been repeatedly graced by the endurance, tension holding and
sustained focus of [my son’s] numerous case managers….

x

They have always been helpful and conscientious in their work. We find that they are the
most client-friendly of any agency we deal with.”

One parent noted that her child’s case manager was not familiar with her child’s condition but
was willing to learn. Some parents said their own skills as an advocate for their child left a
minimal role for their case manager, but they could turn to their CCB when they had a problem.
One parent said she and her case manager would not always agree but they work as a team and
make the best decisions under the circumstances. She said she is comfortable challenging
decisions with her case manager’s boss. One parent described the role her CCB played in
teaching her to be an advocate for her child, providing funding and respite so that she could
attend training and support groups.
Other parents had less favorable things to say about their case manager. Several described their
case manager as “not very helpful,” or inexperienced, or nonresponsive. Some parents shared
stories about instances in which their case manager’s failure to give them correct information had
resulted in lost funding or a lost opportunity to access services. Another parent said his child has
had six case managers in the last year and half. This parent said these case managers have not
observed his child in any other context except in the case manager’s office, so do not have a
good understanding of his child’s needs.
Others comments include:
x

“[H]ere is what is missing in case management: Plans that have goals and solutions in
them with direction on where to apply for what is needed. We are on the wait list so our
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case manager really is only supposed to meet with us twice a year to discuss what we will
do with family support funds (which is a couple hundred dollars a month). Nobody talks
to us about what we can do outside the CCB system. There is no plan. No direction at
all, when there could be. Some people could end up not even needing supported living
and comp services if they did that because there are other resources. So a plan should
include how to apply for Section 8 vouchers, how to connect with Voc Rehab for job
services, etc., to address the needs of an adult who wants to live on their own and work! I
am constantly learning new things from other people, not my case manager. (I found out
my son did not have to use Ticket to Work to work with Voc Rehab again – and that now
I am wasting his Ticket to Work money!) I told my case manager that my son wanted
more education. She sent me a list of community colleges, etc. But I told her when I met
with her recently that what she doesn’t know about that is that my son (because he has an
IEP) can’t be in a degree program, can’t get the accommodations he needs, etc. So those
schools may work with people in wheelchairs, etc., and my son could audit classes, but to
what end? How does that translate into a job?...[N]obody seems to be understanding that
all resources should be considered for each individual and a plan should be based on what
is available to them at the time to achieve their goals…so they don’t wallow away in
quiet desperation….”
x

“My daughter’s case manager has been changed 7-8 times in the last 10 years at least.
And not to different people [because of] turnover, but switched around to the same 3-4
people over and over. And she isn’t a difficult case at all. We get contacted once a year,
when it’s time for her IP. But these will be the people the state and the CEO will listen to
when it comes time to make decisions about her care.”

x

“I don’t get a lot of input from my worker as to what is out there for my son. I have to be
on top of it, I have to be the one to search for resources.” This parent said the CCB’s role
is not “personal.” It is playing a “clinical” or “administrative” role.

Parents also identified some of the problems impacting case managers and suggested additional
supports:
x

Some parents recommended better training for case managers.

x

One parent mentioned the importance of a good supervisor.

x

Parent representatives also identified poor pay as a factor contributing to the quality of
case management, with poor pay contributing to turnover.

x

Parents and CCB representatives cited the additional administrative burden created by
recent reforms as another factor affecting the quality of case management services and
turnover rates.

CCB representatives report that case managers are leaving their jobs because of the added
bureaucracy resulting from recent reforms.
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Other parents talked about own their role as advocates for their children as a way to complement
the services provided by their case manager. They said the family or participant needs to take
responsibility for exploring all the options. Some thought that strong parental advocacy was
important for getting their child what was needed, while at the same time saying that it shouldn’t
matter who you are or what you know, everyone should be treated the same.
For the participants interviewed, the role of the case manager appears to be very limited.
Participants reported that they meet with their case manager only once per year, when it is time
to develop their IP. Case managers can also be involved “when there’s a problem,” but they
were not the first person called by any of the participants interviewed. (It should be noted that
the utilization patterns of the people interviewed are very possibly not representative of those
receiving services.) Not all participants were happy with their case managers. One member
objected to the barrier that her case manager and her guardian presented when it came to
choosing services based on her preference.
One advocate reported that the State used to have annual case meetings for case managers, which
was a way for the State to stay connected. That program has been continued and no other
mechanism exists for maintaining contact with case managers.
Provider Selection Process
Advocates, CCB representatives, parent representatives and participants all had a similar
understanding of the provider selection process as it should work: The case manager works with
the individual to identify needed services and identifies available providers. For those that do
not already have a preference for providers, the case manager drafts a profile of the individual.
The profile is used to solicit interest among providers. Providers participate in an RFP process
and the case manager helps the individual learn more about potential providers in order to make
an informed choice.
Many reported experiences consistent with the ideal process:
x

All of the participants interviewed had a favorable impression of the provider selection
process. All recognized that a participant is not limited to the services offered by a CCB
(unless the CCB is the only provider in the area). Some reported that their case manager
identified potential providers and set up interviews, so that they had an opportunity to
meet with different providers before choosing.

x

Some parents reported that their CCB had been extremely helpful and helped them
navigate a difficult process. Several described the important role their case manager
played in helping to develop a list of questions for prospective providers, so that they
could make an informed choice.

x

One parent said her case manager helped her identify a range of providers that were
better at serving people with her son’s needs. A packet was sent to all of these agencies,
and the parent and case manager interviewed the providers together. The case manager
had helped her develop questions for these interviews and identify what to look for given
her son’s specialized needs. The case manager did not sway her in her decision. One of
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the service agencies under consideration was part of the CCB. She said her case manager
helped her come to the conclusion that the CCB’s service agency did not have the right
capacity to serve her son.
For others, the provider selection process has not worked as well. Some parents reported that
they were guided to the CCB’s services and that they had a hard time finding out about other
options. Some parents said their CCB publicized only their own services so that people, not
knowing about any other options, come to the CCB with a preference for CCB services. (When
an individual already has a preferred provider, an RFP to other providers is not required under
DDD rule.)
x

One parent described a meeting held by her CCB as follows: "The meeting was
advertised as parent information on the [comprehensive] waiver. I was particularly
interested in going to the meeting to find out what housing options were available. When
it got to that part of the meeting addressing housing options, I noticed that one particular
housing community that I knew about wasn't mentioned. Since this was my first foray
into exploring the possibilities for my child, I was a little confused that I didn't hear the
name of the provider I was aware of. I specifically asked if there were any other housing
options. The answer was no, these are the ones we have (a technically correct answer, as
these were the residential options managed by the CCB--but not really the answer I was
seeking). After the meeting, I asked about the housing option I was aware of, and the
presenter said that this meeting was for the services offered by the CCB. It was stated
that there would be a meeting at a different time with information on other providers
(which I have never seen a flyer about - and it has been almost a year since the meeting I
attended.) It is possible that I missed the notice for the additional meeting."

x

One parent raised questions about a newsletter advertising one of the CCB’s service
programs. This parent wondered if that service agency had paid for advertising in the
CCB’s newsletter or whether other service providers had been offered a similar
opportunity to advertise in the newsletter.

x

Another person, objecting to a flyer inviting parents to a forum about the CCB service
programs, expressed the view that it is inappropriate for a CCB receiving public funding
(including mil-levy funding) to provide access to services to spend that public funding on
advertising only for its own services. This person wondered if this CCB would be
distributing information about other providers.

x

One parent said tracking down information about providers was confusing. She did not
know if she had a complete list of providers, which included only 40 service agencies
while she knew her CCB contracted with over 100 independent contractors.

x

The provider listing on DDD’s website was seen as a positive move, but some did not
think it was sufficiently family friendly or publicized. Discussing the lack of clarity in
the listing, one parent said: “It would be great to have a ‘yellow pages’ service directory
for the CCBs. Then I could look under transportation and here are all the providers, and
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here are the day programs and here are the residences and here are the providers that do
community access.”
x

Some parents were frustrated by the fact that the CCB could only hand them a list of
providers but could not tell them about their quality. They saw the need for tools to help
the parent evaluate provider quality. One provider suggested that CCBs hand over the
list without more support as a way to steer people into the CCBs services: people are
given the option of the CCB’s services or handed a list to sort through on their own.

Case managers had mixed experience with the provider selection process. One said that as long
as you keep in mind the needs of families and participants, it is not a problem to be objective in
the provider selection process. One case manager said it is sometimes easier to identify the
weakness of the CCB providers than other agencies.
Another case manager found it very difficult to be objective. She reported that case managers at
her CCB were pushed to fill openings for the CCB’s service providers. She said clients are only
occasionally given a list of all available providers. She said that if a participant or family
member comes in preferring another provider, the IP meeting is about why they did not choose
the CCB’s services. She reported that the administrative office manages the provider selection
process; she does not know which providers are solicited; she does not know if she sees all
responses or if they have been screened. The case manager’s job primarily is to process claims
and monitor service plan implementation. This case manager reported working at other CCBs
and not experiencing the same pressure. She reported that there is very little separation
administratively between the service agencies and case management services; nor is there
separation in the eyes of the consumer walking in the door. Case management and the service
providers are located in the same building, and sometimes across the hall from each other.
A provider also talked about the blurred lines between the case management services and other
services. Often, without other information to clarify the relationship, people are referred to the
CCB’s services as the only option available to them. In questioning the effectiveness of the
“firewall” between case management and direct services, this provider said: “If you still have the
ability to confuse people, how good is your firewall?”
Other concerns about the provider selection process:
x

Advocates and parents reported that they were not given an opportunity to review the
individual profile before it was shared with providers. Some parents said the profile
should be strengths based but is often negative.

x

A number of stakeholders expressed concern that the CCB bypasses the RFP process by
selectively referring people to their own service providers. A provider reported her
understanding that the planning meeting involves the CCB’s “sales people,” who when a
need is identified, say “We can take care of that” and the individual is never given a list
of other options. Or, in response to a request for employment services, a case manager
says: “Let me put you in touch with our Employment Services.” One case manager
reported a specific example of a CCB bypassing the RFP process. The CCB legitimately
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placed people in residential services in an emergency and then kept them there without
opening up the long term placement to other providers.
x

Advocates believe the CCBs are selective in who they solicit interest from, rewarding
providers in the CCB’s “good graces” and steer people to the CCB’s own services. From
their perspective, CCBs reward providers who do not complain about rates or make
referrals to the ARCs.

x

Some saw the CCB redirecting the harder to serve to other service providers. The
advocates see case managers as responsible for limiting the CCB’s liability, and “cherry
picking” the easier to serve, rather than finding the best match between participant and
provider.

Other comments on the provider selection process:
x

Some people saw themselves as having the right to advocate for more choice.

x

Some people thought the problem was less about lack of information about choices than
it was the lack of choices, or service options, for people with specialized needs.

x

One parent objected to the perceived premise underlying the provider selection and RFP
process. For this parent, the CCB should be developing a program to meet a participant’s
needs rather than finding the program the participant fits into best. The individualized
plan is supposed to be unique, with needs met through a variety of service agencies.
Instead, standard services are offered “as close as we can get” to individualized need.
Another parent agreed, saying provider selection is about “what’s most convenient,” even
if it means fitting a round peg into a square hole. Other parents saw it easier to be
flexible and individualize services in rural areas.

x

One parent thought that providers don’t have enough information to decide whether to
respond to an RFP because the amount of funding allocated to an individual is not
specified. This concern may be addressed by the standard rates to be implemented by the
Department.

x

Some parents said they had a lot of provider choices but have trouble finding quality
providers. Some said quality was an issue for rural areas

CCB representatives agreed that there may be inconsistency in how the provider selection
process plays out for different CCBs. They agreed that there was a need for consistent standards
for how to document adherence to this process. Some of their suggestions:
x

Standardize the provider selection process and create more transparency in RFP process.

x

Standardize what the case manager says in the provider selection process; require
participant to sign a document to acknowledge that they were informed about options.
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x

Standardize what the case manager says about participant rights and advocates; require
participant to sign a document to acknowledge that they were informed about options.

CCB representatives refute the claim that CCBs cream the easiest to serve. CCB representatives
see the CCBs as the “provider of last resort,” serving the hardest to serve participants. One CCB
representative reported that his CCB decided to provide services only because previously his
CCB had been “held hostage” when negotiating with service providers over rates and placement.
Another CCB representative offered to produce data showing that his case managers refer to
other service providers at a much higher rate than to services provided by his CCB.
CCB representatives do not believe that CCBs play favorites among providers. One CCB
representative reported that his CCB has been accused of favoritism even when it was not
providing a competing service. In his eyes, the case manager provider is always susceptible to
that claim.
In rural Colorado many CCBs are the only service provider. One rural CCB representative
reports that he would welcome other providers in his community; he reports, however, that
previous attempts have failed because he is not able to guarantee sufficient numbers of
participants. (One provider mentioned the challenges of expanding to a rural community if the
CCB is unwilling to work with the new provider.)
Consumer Choice and Control
The issue of consumer choice and control came up in a number of different ways.
Some parents mentioned their own experience with consumer directed services and the State’s
plans for expanding these options:
x

Parents and participants discussed an earlier taskforce which had issued a series of
recommendations for consumer directed services. Parents saw CMS’ interventions as
sidelining these recommendations. Parent representatives said they would like to see
consumer direction as part of every waiver.

x

One parent expressed disappointment that the person centered planning pilot project in
her area had come to an end. She saw the use of person centered planning and direct
funding as ideal for her son. Now he participates in the traditional annual IP meeting,
where “almost everyone but my son has input and say in the plan.” Also, the funding for
services is reduced with the administrative costs associated with traditional services.

x

Another parent described her arrangement under the SLS waiver, saying that she had
complete control over how her daughter’s funds are spent and what providers work for
her. Her CCB serves as the employer of record and processes payroll. She “orders”
services online each month. She can select among approved providers, including familyrecruited providers. This parent believed that expanding this model to other parts of the
State would “address some of the conflict issues and create competition that should drive
quality and innovation. A completely consumer-driven model without CCB intervention
should also be made available to participants/families who want to take on the
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Some parents report that some CCB directors discourage people from the idea of consumer
directed services, suggesting that there will be no recourse if there is a problem. A provider
said that CCBs do not want families to know that they can be their own case manager under the
SLS waiver; they tell them that emergency funds will not be available if there is a problem.
A number of stakeholders shared the view that the lack of a consumer directed option
strengthened the CCB’s hold on the system; participants are bound to the case management and
referral practices of their CCB.
One parent cautioned that self determination will work for some people but not others and that
other options should be available.
Other stakeholders talked about the need for more control over decision making generally:
x

At least one parent expressed frustration about the CCBs and their case manager’s
“unilateral control” over decisions, in which the parent is informed “here’s what’s been
done” without an opportunity to weigh in.

x

Another parent wrote: “[My CCB] has had a stranglehold on services for as many years
as I can remember. It is the one stop where you get told what services they provide,
which services you can have (regardless of what you might NEED) and where you can
get them.”

x

Another parent said “I’m tired of being told that a stranger, someone who is paid to be in
my daughter’s life, knows more about what is good for her than I do. Someone with no
relationship with her can come in and make decisions for her, and her family for that
matter, without even knowing them.”

x

One parent talked about the fact that families are left out of the loop in managing their
child’s budget. She does not review the provider contracts, get a monthly statement, see
payment rates or bills. Nor does she know whether a worker has been paid. This parent
thought this information would be helpful for better managing how her child’s resources
are managed.

x

Advocates reported that the CCB, having control over access to services, can place
demands on participants and deny services when a person does not meet those demands.
They saw this as one strategy for limiting the CCB’s liability for “difficult” participants.
One advocate cited the example of a person presumed to be sexually dangerous who was
denied services because the individual refused to participate in a behavioral program.
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A number of parents and advocates talked about how the lack of consistency across CCBs limits
consumer choice and control. Because eligibility, resource allocation, and payment rates
decisions vary across CCBs, when a person wants to move from one catchment area to another,
“everything changes.” The uncertainty connected to whether or not a person will lose services,
inhibits a participant’s choice to move.
Participant Complaints
Many people talked about the ability of participants and families to make complaints. An
advocate noted it is often very difficult for a person with developmental disabilities to advocate
for him or herself. As a result, it is important for people with developmental disabilities to have
someone who can help them navigate or connect them into the complaint process. While some
were satisfied with the way things worked, others saw problems.
The participants interviewed talked about their own experiences advocating for themselves.
While many people agreed that it is was important to speak up, many found it hard to so: some
participants reported that they are afraid to speak up. Some reported that they are shy, or don’t
know how to say what they want to say, they are afraid of saying something wrong, or they are
afraid what they say will “come back at them later.” One person said it is intimidating speaking
up to people in higher positions. Another person said if they speak up, they are afraid they will
be “mowed down.”
Many parents also talked about their fears about speaking up:
x

A number of parents discussed their fear of retaliation. One parent said that there are no
checks and balances on the CCB, and parents are reluctant to “bite the hand that feeds
you.” One parent saw the participant profile, used to solicit interest among providers, as
one mechanism for retaliating against a parent that complains. The CCB will negatively
describe your child to discourage responses. In her case, she reported that provider
agencies often reported that her son was not as challenging as the CCB had described him
in his profile.

x

Some said parents are either “in or out” with the CCBs or the Department, depending on
how much trouble they are. If you are out, you do not receive notices, you are not invited
to be on boards, you do not move up on the waiting list, etc.

x

One parent said that concern about retaliation is greater in the adult service system where
services are not an entitlement and can be more easily pulled.

From the CCB perspective, the allegations of retaliation are particularly frustrating. They see
themselves as unable to address complaints when they are made anonymously, but the
complainant will not come forward for fear of retaliation. CCB representatives acknowledge that
there must be fear of retaliation among some participants and families but have not seen
documented evidence. They reported that only a very small fraction of complaints last year
included allegations of retaliation. They also noted that some people will perceive retaliation
when services are terminated or reduced, even when the reduction in services is related to budget
cuts not retaliation.
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One advocate said that the complaint process is not an adequate safeguard for developmental
disability services. This advocate said people with developmental disabilities often need
assistance in advocating for themselves or need someone to advocate on their behalf. A number
of people discussed what can be an uncomfortable role for a case manager who is advocating on
behalf of a participant and challenging the CCB. Advocates see case managers as intimidated by
their employers, the CCBs, limiting their freedom to advocate on behalf of the people they serve.
The advocates wonder why more case managers are not filing appeals to help get services; they
report that a case manager is put in the position of appealing to his or her boss to not reduce
services. One advocate said only a handful of case managers are willing to stand up for their
client.
The challenges of advocating against their employer were confirmed by a number of case
managers interviewed. We heard from more than one person about how difficult it is to advocate
on behalf of a participant against the CCB; that the participant is left without a strong advocate.
At the same time, one case manager, finding no satisfaction from her CCB brought her concern
to the State. She acknowledged that others might not feel comfortable with that approach.
Some sources said that CCBs also discourage access to external advocates, including the ARCs:
x

According to an ARC representative, at least one CCB has told providers in its service
area to stop calling the ARC, that they should call each other to figure things out. The
advocates report that the CCBs do their own investigations into abuse and neglect and
believe the local social services agency blesses their findings.

x

One parent reported that a CCB tried to cancel a provider’s contract accusing the provider
of being a disruptive force by inappropriately advocating for its clients. In the eyes of the
provider, it was a matter of holding the CCB accountable.

Many also identified problems with the way complaints are resolved.
x

Advocates report that the review at the CCB level is potentially biased by the fact that
CCB directors appoint themselves as the impartial hearing officer, based on the
understanding that they were not directly involved in the underlying dispute.

x

Some parents reported that appearing before the administrative law judge is intimidating.

The CCB representatives noted that the mediation process recently developed has hardly been
used. Several people advocated that there needed to be a different, independent pathway for
making a complaint, so that the complaint does not fall back on the head of the person making
the complaint.
Of the participants interviewed, none said they called their case manager as their first step in
addressing a problem. In general, people go to their provider or their family and friends, before
they go to their case manager. At least one person reported that the anticipated delay in response
time was one reason why she did not call her case manager. In addition, it’s likely that because
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this group only met with their case manager once a year, they did not see their case manager as
the place to go for help with a problem.
Pressures on the System
Many stakeholders talked about the challenges presented by the shortage of funding for services.
Funding shortages were blamed for a number of problems:
x

Waiting lists: CCB representatives reported that there are very long waiting lists for
services (reportedly ranging from 10-20 years to 150 years).

x

High caseloads: CCB representatives reported that case managers have very high
caseloads and that the CCBs get paid very little relative to the services provided. One
CCB representative reported that he subsidizes his case management services with other
funding sources, including the mil levy. He said the State pays to provide case
management to 300 people and he is able to provide case management to 900. CCB
representatives reported that they do not get paid for managing waiting lists.

x

Unhappiness: CCBs say that funding shortages mean they have to make hard choices
which lead to unhappiness. They see rural CCBs as having an easier time being flexible,
since the problem of creating precedent is less where there are fewer people. A number
of parents reported that satisfaction with services is very likely tied to whether or not
your child is receiving services as an adult or child. The range of services is greater for
children so parents tend to be more satisfied. The pressure of finding services for an
adult creates greater frustration with the system.

A number of families described the challenges they face while they wait for services or because
needed services are not available, including therapies, employment support, respite, etc. One
parent shared her gratitude for the progress her son had made because of the early intervention
services he had received and explained that, had her son been born a year later, he would not
received the same services because of funding cuts. She said children are now going without
needed early intervention services. One parent noted that the waiting lists are so long you need
to be poor or in crisis in order to get services.
Provider Entry
Previously the CCB had a role in controlling provider entry into their catchment area. That
policy was changed recently so that the CCB is responsible for reviewing a provider application
for completeness and submitting it to DDD for approval.
Prior to the recently policy change, providers objected to the inconsistent criteria used by CCBs
for approving or disapproving a provider’s entry into its service area. In some cases, a provider
would be approved by one CCB and denied by another. The recent policy change does not
eliminate the variation in a CCB’s criteria for approving a provider. However, with recent
changes, a provider approved by one CCB is now approved to provide services throughout the
State.
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One provider said a CCB’s unwillingness to work with an approved provider can be another
effective barrier to provider entry in rural areas. The CCBs believe that recent changes have
minimized their role relative to approving provider entry. They see the role of the CCB as purely
an administrative pass through of the required paper work. They see this change as a having a
negative effect on their ability to assure the quality of providers in their service area. The ability
of a provider to expand to other service areas is viewed as a negative, with questions raised about
the adequacy of state review of expansion letters. CCB representative say it is in the CCB’s
interest to have a lot of service options in their area, mitigating any incentive to block entry.
The CCB as Organized Health Care Delivery System
Although recent reforms have reduced the role of the organized health care delivery system
(OHCDS), a provider representative reports that providers see several advantages to joining an
OHCDS. The CCB provides a billing service attractive to smaller providers unequipped to
manage billing under Medicaid. Billing through the CCB also offers greater security on cash
flow, as compared to direct billing to Medicaid. Also, the OHCDS is viewed as a buffer in the
event that problems that arise, because the CCB is the accountable entity. Providers also believe
that participation in an OHCDS puts them in a favorable position for receiving referrals and for
benefiting from mil-levy funding. One provider said fear of retaliation is the primary reason for
participating in an OHCDS; she said providers are afraid that the small amount of referrals they
do get will go away if they do not participate.
Some CCB representatives saw this shift as a short-term policy change made in response to
direction from CMS. These representatives thought the service system would move back to an
OHCDS model, believing CMS and states would find fee-for-service unsustainable over time.
For this reason, one CCB representative believed there is still value for a CCB to maintain the
OHCDS relationships developed before the reforms were implemented. CCBs also see a
contractual relationship as the most expedient mechanism for addressing quality issues. In the
absence of a contract, which can be pulled for a violation, the CCB has to wait for the State to
intervene. The State often is more cautious in making interventions. At the county level, the
social service agencies are seen as understaffed and not able to make timely responses.
One person provided an example of how a CCB favored itself in establishing reimbursement
rates. In this case, a provider had requested an adjustment to negotiated rates in response to a
change in a client’s conditions. The CCB denied the request and as a result, the provider was no
longer able to meet the individual’s needs and the contract was terminated. The client was then
referred to a CCB provider agency and the rates were increased to cover the additional services
needed. Many agreed that Colorado’s effort to develop standardized rates would address some
concerns around consistency and transparency.
CCB representatives reported that they are limited on the fees that they charge for SLS and that
audits would show noncompliance with these limits. On the other hand, according to CCB
representatives, service providers submit financial statements but CCBs do not know how
service providers spend their money.
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The CCB’s Quality Assurance Role
The CCB is responsible for overseeing the quality of service agencies, including its own service
agencies. The CCBs saw themselves as having a strong role in regulating themselves. Some see
the “corporate culture” as an important determinant of quality: there needs to be a top down
message from leadership that the participant is at the center of services. They also said CCBs
can (and do) take responsibility for bringing up the quality of other CCBs, by sharing best
practices.
The CCBs identified a series of QA mechanism that they use to monitor quality including:
independent satisfaction surveys, trend reports on incidents, investigations (which provide direct
reports to the CCB board), complaints, and spot surveys.
We heard from a number of stakeholders about concerns that CCBs were very good at
addressing quality concerns for other service agencies, but were less responsive when it was their
own service agency. A provider suggested that CCBs can use the quality assurance function to
retaliate against providers, by nit picking. She said the company she contracts with is her direct
competitor; as a result she is held to a different standard. One case manager said, when it comes
to monitoring services, other service agencies are very responsive but she has little leverage to
make things happen with the CCB’s providers; she often experiences a lot of resistance to
making changes she proposes; this case manager said the CCB she works for suppressed
something that should have been a reported incident, saying “Let’s move forward.” Another
case manager described the subtle effect of personal relationships developed by working in the
same location. “They’re in the lunchroom together every day,” making it more difficult for the
case management side of the CCB to challenge the performance of the provider side. We also
heard concerns that CCBs favor contracted providers (providers billing through the CCB, and
paying a fee for that service) over independent providers (providers billing directly to the State).
A provider representative expressed concern about the lack of consistency across CCBs. CCBs
are required to submit their monitoring plans to the Department but providers note there is no
standard process or format for these plans. Agencies can be monitored by multiple CCBs, with
potentially different expectations and potentially different outcomes and issues raised. This
person said there is also variation in the requirements coming from the different Human Rights
Committees associated with each CCB. Some require major documentation and others minimal
evidence in others. In the eyes of this provider, CCBs have been delegated authority with limited
standardization and transparency, leading to significant variations in practice. They are viewed
by providers as quasi-regulatory, without strong central oversight. This person believes that the
State should take a stronger role in imposing standards and insisting on transparent practices in
operation and quality oversight.
Advocates thought the CCB should not have a quality assurance function over its own service
agencies or other service agencies.
CCB representatives thought it was very important for the CCB to have some control over the
quality of providers operating in their catchment area. The CCBs see themselves as playing an
important QA role, providing technical assistance and monitoring services. CCBs also reported
that the CCB has a strong incentive to be on top of the quality of all providers, whether its own,
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contracted, or independent. When providers fail the CCB is held responsible for finding
alternative services and can be held liable for any injury resulting from a poor quality provider.
In the eyes of the CCBs interviewed, the CCB holds itself to a higher level of accountability
when it also provides services. They also report that their own case managers are some of the
toughest critics of services provided by the CCB and that the division between case management
is very real within the CCBs represented. CCB representatives believe that the DDD onsite
survey would catch any favoritism were it to exist. They are not aware of any documented cases
of favoritism toward contracted providers.
Advocates see the Human Rights Committee as a “rubber stamp” for CCB actions. They report
that only the information provided by the CCB is provided to the HRC. Also, advocates reported
that those members who challenge the CCBs are “uninvited” as continued members. Some
parents also reported that there are some parents that are “in” with the CCBs that get invited to
participate on the HRC or board but that those parents that are not “in” never receive an
invitation. One person reported that, as a member of a Human Rights Committee, he was in
position to pass judgment on the care provided for many of the CCB’s clients; he said the CCB
regularly proved itself to be an excellent provider.
Some CCBs saw the need for a stronger hand from DDD. Some of the improvements suggested
by CCB representatives include:
x

Greater DDD involvement in incident investigations; DDD should be reviewing incident
reports.

x

DDD should respond to legitimate issues and questions raised by families and
participants.

x

Faster response from DDD in emergencies; the CCB has to write a report and can wait 13 weeks for a response from the State, during which the situation is not corrected. The
CCBs see themselves as the party held accountable.

x

Stronger leadership from DDD; more willingness to take the heat. DDD should have a
wider range of tools for regulating CCBs; right now DDD has only a big stick or no stick.

x

DDD conducts all satisfaction surveys, so that the surveys are seen as independent of
CCB influence.

Advocates regretted changes to DDD’s onsite survey process. In the past advocates participated
in these surveys. Advocate representatives saw value in having an independent set of eyes to
identify potential problems. Also, advocates reported that the participant evaluation of services
is facilitated by the case manager or the service provider, creating a potential barrier to accurate
and honest participant feedback. They report that there is anecdotal evidence that the participant
evaluations are manipulated.
Accountability
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We heard a wide range of comments from parents and advocates encouraging more transparency
and accountability for CCBs.
x

One parent thought it was important for the salaries of CCB executive directors to be
publicly available, making the board of directors more accountable for salary decisions.
Several parents raised concerns about the salaries of executive directors, expressing
concern about how tax dollars were being spent and who makes decisions about salaries.

x

One parent identified a series of concerns about a CCB’s accountability. Beginning with
her concern that her CCB provided full day programs to the children of employees, she
asked: “How do services get divvied out? Who makes those decisions? It feels like
those committees, there to protect us, are hand picked by those who are holding the purse
strings. How about a more fair selection process? Who is monitoring the hand picked
committees….? When asked for documentation on how the services or funding is
divided, they don’t provide policies/procedures—even though they will you tell you they
do. Same thing when asked for a copy of the budget, it’s not available, can’t have it,
can’t get it.”

x

A number of comments relate to how funding decisions are made: “We constantly hear
the problem is with funding. However, why won’t they show us where the money comes
from and where it goes?” “[T]here is no transparency in the finances so it is hard to tell
the cost of the services being provided or how much has been spent.” One parent
reported having to cut back on services although the amount of money available to his
child is the same. He attributed this reduction to higher charges from his CCB.

x

One parent suggested that families receive an Explanation of Benefit, so they can monitor
what is being claimed for services. Access to this information would also make it easier
to manage the choices they are making.

One parent objected to the recent changes connected accountability. While recognizing the need
for accountability, she believes the CCB must be able to serve its clients without the
accountability process interfering. She hopes her CCB will not have to continue to say “Mother
may I?” for routine fiscal decisions, including approval of a $50 recreational class for her son.
This parent was confident that her CCB had adequate internal accountability mechanisms in
place before these recent reforms were made.
Some CCB representatives agreed that there is a need for greater standardization and
transparency in how CCBs operate.
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Consistency and Local Control
More than once Colorado’s CCB delivery system was described as “twenty different systems
operating in twenty different ways.” Said one parent: “It’s the luck of the drawer where you
live.”
Some of these differences are procedural, e.g., how eligibility criteria are applied, how waiting
lists are managed, how the provider selection process is managed. One person reported that one
CCB, responsible for determining eligibility for the CES waiver, had determined that no child in
its region met CES waiver requirements. She reported that she knew that not to be the case and
her organization helped to get this waiver implemented in this area.
Other differences seem to be philosophical. One parent described making a choice about where
to live based on one CCB’s practices relating to segregated, rather than integrated, services.
Others are cultural. To a large extent, cultural differences appear to be driven by the urban or
rural nature of the community. Many parents talked about the flexibility and responsiveness of
CCBs in rural communities. One parent having personal experience in both urban and rural
settings, described urban services as “overwhelming.” Participants are “almost treated like a
number,” with the question being what they can provide not what is available in the community.
In the rural area where he now lives, services are responsive and personalized, and the CCB and
the local community have taken creative approaches to develop employment opportunities and
fundraise.
The quality and availability of services was also identified as another difference. Some saw this,
too, as connected to whether in a rural or urban community. For example, one parent said it is
generally harder to find employment opportunities for participants in rural areas. Some parents
complained that quality providers are harder to find in rural areas.
Many advocated for greater standardization across CCBs. CCB representatives also recognized
the need for great consistency and transparency. At the same time, a number of parents and CCB
representatives expressed strong preference for preserving the local presence of a CCB and
ability of a CCB to be flexible and responsive to individual needs. This preference seemed
particularly strong among those living in rural areas.
Many also discussed Colorado’s strong preference for “local control.” The need for local control
was explained by the diversity of needs across Colorado. Because some CCBs operate in urban
centers and others in large tracts of rural land, they encounter very different community
resources and provider costs. State government was described as “detached.” CCB
representatives believe that regional delivery of services would be a “disaster” for rural services
areas.
According to one advocate, the public sees the CCB as a local community agency and do not
believe the government should be able to tell it how to do business; but the CCB is providing a
government service and needs to comply with federal and state law.. In this advocate’s eyes,
many CCBs operate as fiefdoms.
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Political Context
In every interview, the role of politics was raised. The trade associations rely on former
legislators as lobbyists. The CCBs include legislators on their boards. The advocates call on
legislators (and CMS or Health Care Policy and Finance) to step in when other avenues fail.
Participants agreed that if you really need to be heard, you have to go to the legislature. Some
parents reported that they have been “shamed” for not going to the CCB first.
The dialogue between advocates and CCBs was described as “toxic,” and interviews with each
included allegations of inappropriate conduct on the others’ part. Many saw the toxicity as tied
to personalities. In at least one case, however, the combative history between the ARC and the
CCB seems to have carried over, even with changes in leadership and personalities. Advocate,
CCB, and provider representatives expressed their belief that DDD’s ability (or willingness) to
influence the political dialogue is limited and needs to be more active.
Not all relationships between CCBs and ARCs are adversarial. At least one CCB includes ARC
representation on its board and CCB representation on the ARC board. One CCB representative
reported that he would welcome an ARC in his region, since it would relieve him of some
advocacy responsibilities with, e.g., school districts. However, previous attempts to start an
ARC in his region have failed, probably because a critical mass of discontent does not exist in
his region.
Among parents there were also expressions of mistrust. Some parents expressed fear of
retaliation from parents who were also CCB board members or employed by the CCB. On the
other side, some parents reported that they did not feel free to speak up in front of parents who
are strong critics of the CCBs. One parent suggested that many parents resent outspoken critics
of CCBs (such as herself) because “They are very worried they will lose the little morsels of help
they do get.”
CCB representatives report that close to 50% of board membership is composed of participants
or parents or others interested in the field. One parent said there were three to four parents on his
CCB’s board, including him. He said the board had diverse representation and good dialogue,
with parents comfortable expressing their opinion. Some parents believe that parents who are
board members get preferential treatment, including moving up waiting lists faster.
The CCBs cite improved relations between HCPF and DDD as a positive change and believe that
many of the changes currently being implemented are correcting problems created by historically
poor communication between the two agencies.
Issues and Comments Outside of Scope
The following issues and comments are outside the scope of our analysis. They are recorded
here for the benefit of the Department.
x

Advocates opposed using historical billing to set standards rates. They believe CCBs have
creamed the easiest to serve and have paid themselves the highest rates; assuming a CCB’s
historical rates reflect their costs will inappropriately inflate their rates.
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x

Advocates raised the question of whether a CCB providing only case management services
“can make a go of it.”

x

CCB representatives identified the need for emergency back up from the state. They said
they can’t get someone into a Regional Center without agreeing to take someone else out.
Currently there are no psych beds in Colorado; people are “treated” or restrained in
emergency rooms.

x

Advocates reported that some people with a high level of need are refused services by the
CCB and end up in prison even when the individual has not been convicted of crime.

x

One parent reported that a parent dissatisfied with the quality of services in a group home had
been told that leaving the group home meant going to the bottom of the wait list.

x

One parent expressed concern about DDD spending money on systems change, new layers of
bureaucracy and administrative costs.

x

Several parents mentioned problems connected with SSI.

x

One parent would prefer the CCB spend money on services, not bricks and mortar.

x

One parent advocated for more flexibility in tailoring services to need or changing need, with
fewer layers of approval and paperwork.

x

A number of parents talked about their need for respite services.

x

One provider raised concerns about case managers who pick up extra work providing direct
support to their clients, through another provider agency. In that situation, the relationship
between the case manager and service provider are so interconnected that the case manager
cannot provide an independent assessment of case management and the service agency is in a
difficult position monitoring the services provided by the person responsible for monitoring
its services.
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